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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
.1.- Viewing the evidence, .-•-; he inferences fro - evidence, in ,i li«phi most 
favorable to support the unanimous verdict of the jury, did the Siggards perform the steps 
necessary to forfeit CIC's interest in the Contract? 
Standard of Review. In reviewing a jury verdict, the appellate court must view 
the evidence in the light most supportive of the verdict and assume that the jury believed 
those aspects of the evidence to sustain its judgment and will upset a jury verdict only upon a 
showing "that the evidence so clearly preponderates in favor of the appellant that reasonable 
people wo ot differ 01 i tl le outcoi i le of the case." Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 
918 P.2d 461 (Utah 1996). 
2. Viewin*- f evidence, • :nferences froi n the evic lence, ii i a light most 
favorable to support the unanimous verdict of the jury, did CIC's Notice of Interest, filed on 
property to whicl l it 1 lad i IC • legal i igl it, violate *• ! i'en Statute? 
Standard of Review. Same as Issue 1. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Annotated § 38-9-1, Liability of Person Filing Wrongful Lien: 
A person who claims an interest in, or a lien or encumbrance 
against, real property, who causes or has caused a document asserting 
that claim to be recorded or filed in the office of the county recorder, 
who knows or has reason to know that the document is forged, 
185112.2 
groundless, or contains a material misstatement or false claim, is liable 
to the owner or title-holder for $1,000 or for treble actual damages, 
whichever is greater, and for reasonable attorney fees, and costs as 
provided in this chapter, if he willfully refuses to release or correct such 
document of record within 20 days from the date of written request from 
the owner or beneficial title-holder of the real property. This chapter is 
not intended to be applicable to mechanics' or materialmen's liens. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This case, as ultimately tried to the jury, is one for 
specific performance of a real estate contract. When the buyer of the property, Commercial 
Investment Corporation ("CIC"), failed to make the required annual interest payment due 
under the contract, the property owners, Don and Glenna Siggard, as trustees of the Don and 
Glenna F. Siggard Family Trust ("Siggards"), exercised their right to declare a default of the 
contract, and provided CIC with written notice of the default and of the thirty day period to 
cure the default. When CIC did not cure its default under the contract, the Siggards 
exercised their contractual right to declare the contract terminated and sent notice of that 
termination to CIC, which CIC received two days prior to the end of the 30-day cure period. 
Although CIC received and understood the notice of its default and knew the period of time 
in which it had to cure its default, CIC did nothing to cure the default or otherwise attempt 
to perform its obligations under the contract. Instead, in an attempt to preserve an interest 
in property it did not want to pay for, CIC, one day prior to forfeiture, recorded a Notice of 
Interest on the entire 38 acre parcel of the Siggards' property, even though it had a 
contractual right to purchase only 16 acres. Two years later, after CIC initiated this action, 
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and the Siggards were made aware of CIC's wrongful Notice of Interest, the Siggards 
counterclaimed for breach of contract, breach of covenant of good fa; - .< • .:• joaling, 
unjust enrichment and CIC's violation of the Utah Wrongful Lien Statute by the filing of the 
Notice of Interest. 
B. Course of Proceedings. CIC filed its lawsuit in 1992, two years after 
CIC's default of the required $56,000.00 annual interest payment due under the contract and 
after the Siggards' notice to CIC that the contract was terminated. CIC's original complaint 
alleged claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment and rescission. (Complaint, R -7.) 
It was not a year later, and after the Siggards had discovered the lien on their property 
and demanded that the Notice of Interest recorded against the Siggards' property be released, 
and counterclaimed for violation of the I JtalI Wrongful I ieiI Statute that CIC decided it was 
now interested in the property and amended its Complaint to add a claim for specific 
performance. (Ai i iei ided Cot i iplaii it, R. 295-30*' J1 Helme irul. t'1*'" dated specific 
performance as its sole remedy in the lawsuit and relinquished its other claims. (Election of 
Remedies and Motion for Non-jury ') o33-34; .• '• - « V-M> K . ) 
C. Disposition. In August 1995, the case was tried to a jury on CIC's claim 
for specific performance and the Siggards' counterclaims. After a four-day trial, the jury 
returned a unanimous special verdict, finding that CIC was not entitled to specific 
performance, that CIC was not excused from its obligation to make the annual $56,000.00 
interest payment, that CIC breached the contract and its covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, and that CIC violated the Utah Wrongful Lien Statute. (Special Verdict, R. 1023-
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1025, Add. L.) The jury also found that the Siggards had performed all steps necessary to 
forfeit CIC's interest in the contract. (Special Verdict, R. 1023-1024, Add. L.) The trial 
court entered judgment incorporating the jury's findings on August 18, 1995. (Judgment, 
R. 1064-1067, Add. M.) 
CIC moved for a new trial on the wrongful lien and forfeiture issues. 
(R. 1146-1147.) Judge Iwasaki denied that Motion, ruling that: 
1. The evidence submitted to the jury . . . was 
sufficient to support the jury's findings that CIC's filing of 
the Notice of Interest violated the Utah Wrongful Lien 
Statute and that the Siggards performed all steps necessary 
to forfeit CIC's interest in the real estate contract. 
2. The law presented to and applied by the jury at 
trial as to those issues was correct. 
(Order Denying Motion for New Trial, R. 1288-1290, Add. N.) Additionally, the Court 
granted judgment in favor of the Siggards for its attorneys' fees and costs associated with the 
wrongful lien claim in the amount of $17,325.00 (R. 1219-1295, Add. P). CIC appealed the 
case to the Utah Supreme Court (R. 1302-1304) and the case was transferred to this Court on 
January 11, 1996. (R. 1364.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the early 1970s, Don and Glenna Siggard acquired a 60 acre parcel of property 
at the intersection of 11400 South and 1000 East, located in Sandy, Utah. (R. 1680, 
Tr. 372:3-17.) The Siggards purchased the property for their retirement, believing it would 
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eventually be a good investment. Don Siggard had worked as a brick mason for 30 years as 
his life's occupation. (R. 1679, Tr. 370:13-14.) During this period, Mr. Siggard obtained a 
contractor's license and constructed several homes, which he either lived in himself, built for 
his children, or sold to third parties. (R. 1680, Tr. 371:10-24; Tr. 374:16-23.) By 1989 the 
Siggards still owned 38 acres of the original 60 acre parcel, which had been placed in a 
family trust known as the Don and Glenna F. Siggard Family Trust. (R. 1692, Tr. 422:25, 
423:1-13.) This 38 acre parcel is the subject of this lawsuit. 
In 1988 Busch Corporation, a Utah corporation owned by Bob Busch ("Busch") 
(R. 1564, Tr. 14:15-24), expressed interest in purchasing a portion of the Siggards' property 
for commercial development. Busch was a commercial property developer who, for the 
previous two decades, had been involved in the development and construction of numerous 
office buildings, shopping centers and other commercial developments both in Utah and other 
states. (R. 1564, Tr. 14:25, 15:1-9.) Busch was the owner or principal party "in all kinds 
of companies" (R. 1619, Tr. 198:7-8), including Busch Corporation (R. 1564, Tr. 14:15-18), 
Development West (R. 1565, Tr. 18:2-10), Busch Properties, Inc. (R. 1631, Tr. 245:1-8), 
and Commercial Investment Corporation ("CIC"). (R. 1565 Tr. 17:10-13.) On March 3, 
1988, the Busch Corporation "or its assigns" entered into an Earnest Money Agreement with 
the Siggards to purchase 20 acres of the Siggards' 38 acre parcel. (Trial Ex. 1, Add. A.) 
It was CIC that eventually entered into a Real Estate Contract with the Siggards. 
(Trial Ex. 7, Add. B.) CIC was a holding company for one of Busch's many operating 
companies, either Development West (R. 1619, Tr. 197:8-18) or Busch Properties, Inc. 
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(R. 1620, Tr. 199:7-11.) CIC maintained no bank accounts (R. 1620, Tr. 199:7-11), or 
checking accounts. (R. 1631, Tr. 245:15-18.) It had no employees (R. 1619, Tr. 197:6) 
nor paid any payroll (R. 1619, Tr. 197:8-16), and otherwise was entirely dependent upon the 
assets of Busch's various other companies. (R. 1620, Tr. 199:18-24.) 
On August 31, 1988, the Siggards and CIC entered into a Real Estate Contract (the 
"Contract") for the purchase of 20 acres ("Property") of the Siggards' 38 acre parcel of 
property. (Trial Ex. 7, Add. B.) The Contract expressly defined the property to be 
purchased by CIC as "approximately 20 acres of real property (the "Property") located at the 
southeast corner of 11400 South and 1000 East. . . . " (Trial Ex. 7, 1 1, Add. B.) The 
Contract further provided that CIC would purchase the property under the following 
contractual obligations, among others: 
a. CIC was to pay a down payment of $5,000 (Trial Ex. 7, f 2, 
Add. B); 
b. CIC was to obtain commercial zoning of the 20 acres by March 3, 
1989 (Trial Ex. 7, 1 16, Add. B); 
c. CIC was to designate the 20 acres it intended to purchase out of the 
38 acre parcel (Trial Ex. 7, K 1, Add. B); 
d. CIC was to pay ten annual interest payments of $69,500 to be paid 
on or before March 3 of each year, beginning March 3, 1989 (Trial 
Ex. 7, f 2, Add. B); and 
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e. CIC was to pay a principal payment of $695,000 at the end of the 
ten year term (Trial Ex. 7, 1 2, Add. B; R. 888-889, Pretrial Order, 
I4.(d), (e)and(f), Add. K.)1 
CIC also covenanted in the Contract "to keep the Property free and clear of all 
liens and encumbrances resulting from the acts of Buyer during the term of this Contract, 
except for property which Buyer purchases under Section 4 herein." Subsection 4 of the 
Real Estate Contract referred to the 20 acre parcel CIC contracted to purchase. (Trial Ex. 7, 
f 4 , 11, Add. B.) 
Although CIC entered into the Contract with the Siggards, which obligated CIC to 
make payments of principal and interest on the property in excess of $1 million over the term 
of the Contract, CIC actually made no payments under the Contract. (R. 1631, 
Tr. 244:21-25, 245:1.) Although the Contract provided an acknowledgment that CIC had 
paid the required $5,000.00 down payment, (Trial Ex. 7, f 2, Add. B), the down payment 
was never paid, either by CIC or any of the other Busch companies. (R. 1577, Tr. 67:20-
25, 68:1-12; R. 1761, Tr. 695:6-21.) The one and only payment made in furtherance of the 
Contract was made by Busch Properties, Inc. after Busch had re-negotiated an amendment to 
the Contract. (R. 1631, Tr. 244:21-25, 245:1; Tr. Ex. 18, Add. E.) 
In March 1989 CIC had not met several of its obligations under the Contract. 
(R. 1686, Tr. 396:13-21.) CIC had not obtained rezoning of the 20 acres required to be 
1
 The Contract was amended in March 1989, reducing the amount of acreage CIC would 
purchase from 20 acres to 16 acres, thereby reducing the annual interest payments in 
paragraph (d) above from $69,500 to $56,000 and the principal payment from $695,000 to 
$560,000. (Tr. Ex. 17, Add. D.) 
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zoned commercial by March 3, 1989. (R. 1686, Tr. 398:5-23; R. 1605, 142:10-13; Trial 
Ex. 17, Add. D.) CIC had not paid the $5,000.00 down payment required under the 
Contract. (R. 1577, Tr. 67:20-25, 68:1-12; R. 1761, Tr. 675:6-21.) Nor had CIC paid the 
first annual interest installment that was due March 3, 1989. (R. 1686, Tr. 396:13-21.) 
Three days later, on March 6, 1989, Mr. Siggard hand-delivered a hand-written "Notice of 
Default" to CIC informing CIC of its default of the Contract and requesting that CIC cure 
the default or the Contract would terminate in 30 days. (R. 1686, Tr. 396:20-25; 397:1-13; 
Tr. Ex. 16, Add. C.) 
Upon CIC's receipt of the March 6, 1989 Notice of Default, rather than pay the 
$69,500.00 interest installment, CIC requested that the Siggards re-negotiate the Contract and 
defer the interest payment installment then due until after CIC had either subdivided the 
property or completed commercial development on the property. (R. 1687, Tr. 399:8-17.) 
CIC further sought to reduce the size of the parcel CIC was obligated to purchase from the 
original 20 acres, to 10 acres, thereby reducing the value of the Contract by $690,000.00. 
(R. 1686, Tr. 398:5-25; 399:1-7; Trial Ex. 7.) Ultimately, the Siggards agreed to a 
reduction in the acreage to be purchased from 20 acres to 16 acres (R. 1687, Tr. 399:5-7; 
Trial Ex. 17, Add. D.), but the Siggards did not relinquish their right to timely payment of 
the annual interest installment. (R. 1687, Tr. 399:8-25; Trial Ex. 17, Add. D.) 
As a result of this negotiation, CIC and the Siggards entered into an Amendment 
of the Real Estate Contract ("Amendment"), which reduced the acreage to be purchased to 
16 acres and deleted the requirement that CIC obtain commercial zoning on the property 
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prior to March 3, 1989. (Trial Ex. 17, Add. D.) Upon amendment of the Contract, the first 
interest installment, now $56,000.00, was paid on March 30, 1989 by check drawn on the 
account of Busch Properties, Inc.2 (R. 1687, Tr. 399:18-23; R. 1631, 244:22-25; 245:1; 
Tr. Ex. 18, Add. E.) This initial payment of $56,000.00 would be the only payment the 
Siggards would ever receive on a contract that, under its amended terms, was to have paid 
them in excess of $1 million in principal and interest payments. (R. 1690, Tr. 411:12-14.) 
As previously noted, CIC never paid the $5,000.00 down payment, and CIC (nor any other 
Busch company) did not make, or offer to make, any of the subsequent annual interest 
payments that came due on March 3, 1990, or that would be due each succeeding March 3 
thereafter (had the Contract been in effect). (R. 1690, Tr. 411:12-14.) 
After the parties executed the Amendment to the Contract, CIC worked with Sandy 
City to obtain a commercial zoning designation for the 16 acres it intended to purchase. 
(R. 1605, Tr. 142:14-25; R. 1606, 143:1-14.) The negotiations with Sandy City ultimately 
resulted in Sandy City's approval of rezoning, with numerous restrictions placed on the 
commercial development. (Trial Ex. 14.) Sandy City imposed a restriction that any 
commercial development of the Property would be limited to 10 net acres, and numerous 
other restrictions, including the widening of 11400 South, restricting the hours of operation 
of the proposed commercial center, and requiring participation in the costs of installing 
traffic signals at the intersection of 11400 South and 1000 East. (R. 1605, Tr. 142:4-25; 
2
 This first annual installment was paid reluctantly. Mr. Siggard testified that after 
Busch wrote the check "he threw it down on the desk and he stormed out of the room." (R. 
1687, Tr. 399:18-23). 
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R. 1606, 143:1-14; R. 1641, 285:20-25, 286; Trial Ex. 14.) The additional cost of just one 
of these restrictions, the widening of 11400 South, was a potentially costly proposition. 
(R. 1643, Tr. 294:4-8.) 
Shortly after Sandy City approved the restricted commercial zoning, CIC, through 
Busch, informed Mr. Siggard that the zoning had been approved and asked Mr. Siggard if he 
would defer the payment of the second $56,000.00 interest installment due on March 3, 
1990, until after CIC had completed commercial development of the 10 acre parcel. 
(R. 1688, Tr. 405:2-7.) Mr. Siggard declined this request. (R. 1688, Tr. 405:7.) 
Having been informed of the zoning change in August or September of 1989, 
Mr. Siggard asked CIC which 16 acre portion of the 38 acre parcel CIC wanted surveyed, 
which was a contractual obligation for the Siggards under the Contract. (R. 1688, 
Tr. 405:8-25; 406:1-25; Trial Ex. 7, 1 12, Add. B.) Mr. Siggard was told that CIC was not 
certain which exact area it wanted surveyed, and that CIC would inform Mr. Siggard, at 
some later date, as to the area CIC wanted surveyed. (R. 1688, Tr. 406:20-22.) In 
anticipation of CIC's designation of the property to be surveyed, and the 45-day period in 
which he would need to complete such a survey, Mr. Siggard immediately retained a 
surveyor to perform the survey once CIC designated the parcel it intended to purchase. 
(R. 1688, Tr. 404:17-23; R. 1732, 579:18-25; Trial Ex. 27, Add. J.) Time passed, and, 
despite Mr. Siggard's repeated requests that CIC identify the 16 acre parcel to be surveyed 
(R. 1688-1689, Tr. 406:19-25, 407:1-23), CIC never informed Mr. Siggard what portion of 
the 38 acre parcel it intended to purchase. (R. 1688-1689, Tr. 406:1-25; 407:1-2.) CIC, 
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after being asked three times for its designation, ultimately told Mr. Siggard that CIC "would 
let him know" when it determined what portion of the property CIC would purchase. 
(R. 1689, Tr. 407:22-25; 408:1-2.) After this communication, CIC never contacted Mr. 
Siggard to designate the area to be surveyed. (R. 1689, Tr. 409:5-13.) 
On March 3, 1990 the second $56,000.00 interest installment, the installment CIC 
had tried to postpone in August or September of 1989, became due and was not paid. 
(R. 1689, Tr. 409:24-25, 410:1.) Having received no payment, Mr. Siggard drafted a 
Notice of Default, and sent it certified mail to CIC. (R. 1689, Tr. 410:7-25, Add. F.) CIC 
received the letter on March 5, 1990. (R. 1689-1690, Tr. 410:7-25; 411:1-11; Pretrial 
Order, Add. K.; Trial Ex. 20, Add. F.) Busch read and reviewed the March 5, 1990 letter, 
(R. 1610, Tr. 161:3-14), and understood from the letter that CIC had 30 days in which to 
make the overdue $56,000.00 interest installment or CIC would forfeit its rights in the 
Property. (R. 1610-1611, Tr. 162:20-25, 163:1-15.) Neither Busch, nor any other CIC 
representative, contacted Mr. Siggard after receipt of the Notice of Default on March 5, 
1990. (R. 1690, Tr. 411:12-14.) 
Thirty-one days after the March 3, 1990 payment had been due, Mr. Siggard, 
having received no response from CIC, drafted and caused a second notice, dated April 3, 
1990, to be delivered to CIC. (R. 1690, Tr. 411:18-23.) This April 3, 1990 notice stated 
that CIC had not cured its default and that the Contact was therefore terminated pursuant to 
its terms. (R. 1690, Tr. 411:18-23; Trial Ex. 21, Add. G.) CIC received the second notice 
on April 3, 1990, thirty-one days after the delinquent payment had been due, but two days 
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prior to the end of the 30 day cure period, which period had begun to run from CIC's receipt 
of the March 5, 1990 Notice. (R. 1690, Tr. 412:22-25; Pretrial Order, R. 890, Add. K.) 
Mr. Siggard believed the 30 day cure period began to run from March 3, 1990, the date the 
payment was due, rather than March 5, 1990, the date CIC actually received the March 5, 
1990 notice. (R. 1690, Tr. 412:16-25.) 
Notwithstanding this early notice, CIC understood that it had two days remaining 
before CIC would forfeit any rights under the Contract (R. 1611, Tr. 166:21-25; R. 1633, 
251:24-25; 252:1-2), and acknowledged, through Busch, that CIC could have paid the 
$56,000.00 during those remaining two days, had CIC so desired. (R. 1633, Tr. 252:7-10.) 
Busch's testimony was: 
Q: Okay. In that two day period, from April 3rd to April 5th, did 
you pay $56,000.00 to Don and Glenna Siggard? 
A: No, but I could have. 
(R. 1633, Tr. 252:7-10.) Busch, as CIC's president, also acknowledged that he knew the 
payment had come due on March 3, 1990 and that CIC had an obligation to pay it. 
(R. 1614-1615, Tr. 178:24-25, 179:1-2.) Busch further admitted that CIC never made the 
$56,000.00 payment, and that CIC never offered to make it. (R. 1612, Tr. 167:12-18.) No 
evidence was submitted to the jury by CIC that receiving the letter two days early made any 
difference to CIC. Indeed, it is clear from the evidence that CIC had no intention of paying 
the $56,000.00 payment on March 3, 1990 or before April 5, 1990, the end of the 30 day 
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cure period.3 (R. 1612, Tr. 167:22-25; 168:1.) CIC claimed that Mr. Siggard had refused 
to provide a survey, and thus, CIC alleged, the Siggards were in breach of the Contract, 
which alleged breach somehow excused CIC from tendering the $56,000.00 payment. 
(R. 1612, Tr:167:22-25; 168:1; Appellant's Brief, 10.)4 In short, CIC did not believe it 
owed the Siggards the $56,000.00 interest installment. (R. 1634, Tr. 257:1-11.) 
Rather than make the $56,000.00 interest installment payment as required under 
the Contract, or tender it in any fashion, Busch "immediately called my counsel and said, 
'Send Mr. Siggard a letter'" (R. 1612, Tr. 167:4-5) and further instructed CIC's lawyer to 
put Mr. Siggard "on notice that he was in violation of the contract and that, you know, I said 
'Just do all the necessary things legally to be done.'" (R. 1612, Tr. 167:6-11.) CIC did not 
make the $56,000.00 payment to Mr. Siggard (R. 1612, Tr. 167:12-14) and never offered to 
make it (R. 1612, Tr. 167:17-18). 
On April 4, 1990, one day before the cure period expired, CIC's counsel prepared 
a letter, as instructed by CIC (R. 1612, Tr. 167:4-11), and sent it to Mr. Siggard (Trial 
3
 As March has 31 days, the 30 day cure period would begin on March 7, 1990, the day 
after CIC's receipt of the March 5, 1990 notice, and end on April 5, 1990. 
4
 The jury did not believe Busch's testimony that CIC requested a survey prior to the 
March 3, 1990 installment payment deadline, and found, rather, that CIC breached the 
Contract and was not excused from tendering its performance or from performing its 
contractual obligations of making the payment. (Special Verdict, R. 1023, 1024, Add. L.) 
(Judgment, R. 1064-1067, Add. M.) Indeed, CIC's own witness, Andrew Walton, an 
employee of the Busch companies for 22 years (R. 1638, Tr. 271:12-13) testified that 
Siggard never refused to provide CIC a survey. (R. 1644, Tr. 283:1-3.) CIC has not 
contested the jury's findings on these issues. (Appellant's Brief, 15.) 
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Ex. 23, Add. H.), which letter stated, among other things, that CIC considered the notices of 
default defective because: 
1. The Amendment executed by Commercial Investment Corporation 
on March 30, 1989 was not executed by Glenna Siggard, Trustee; 
2. Don Siggard and Glenna F. Siggard, as Trustees under the Don 
and Glenna F. Siggard Family Trust Agreement had not sent any 
notices required under paragraph 18 of the Real Estate Contract;5 
3. The April 3, 1990 notice was sent two days premature. 
(Trial Ex. 23, Add. H.) In the letter, CIC's lawyer further told the Siggards that CIC had 
received zoning approval from Sandy City, that a certified ALTA survey was due, and that 
the Siggards were in breach of the Contract for failure to provide the survey. Additionally, 
CIC's lawyer's letter of April 4, 1990 stated that CIC was ready to receive a trust deed and 
note on the property pursuant to the terms of the Contract (Trial Ex. 23, Add. H). 
Paragraph 3 of the Contract provided that CIC could request from the Siggards a warranty 
deed and note on the Property after it had received both commercial zoning and site plan 
approval on the Property. (Emphasis added.) (Trial Ex. 7, % 3, Add. B.) In fact, CIC had 
not obtained site plan approval on the property and this demand was unjustified and 
unwarranted under the terms of the Contract (R. 1633, Tr. 252:11-22). Busch admitted that 
the demand was "a mistake." (R. 1633, Tr. 252:14-19.) 
5
 Evidently, either the fact that the Siggards failed to designate in their notices to CIC 
that they were acting as "trustees", or that the documents were not signed by both trustees, 
formed the basis of CIC's alleged non-performance of the terms of the Contract. In either 
case, it seemed a trivial issue on which to hang one's rights to a valuable contract and risk 
forfeiture of $56,000.00, a risk that could have easily been avoided with a simple offer to 
make the admittedly due payment. 
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The April 4, 1990 letter from CIC's lawyer was the first, and only time, that CIC 
ever asked Siggards to provide a survey. (R. 1690, Tr. 414:1-3.) 
In addition to having its lawyer send the April 4, 1990 letter, and rather than 
paying the obligation admittedly due, CIC that same day, April 4, 1990, recorded a "Notice 
of Interest" on the entire 38 acre parcel owned by the Siggards. (R. 1611; Tr. 165:14-24; 
Trial Ex. 22, Add. I.) CIC recorded this lien on all 38 acres, even though the Contract, as 
amended, entitled CIC to only 16 acres and even though CIC's interest was about to be 
forfeited.6 (Trial Ex. 1, Add. D.) At the time CIC recorded the Notice of Interest on 
Siggards' entire 38 acre parcel, CIC had in its possession legal descriptions for an 18.5 acre 
parcel of the Property, (R. 1738, Tr. 605:7-19; Trial Exs. 3, 29), a 16.2 acre parcel of the 
Property, (R. 1738, Tr. 605:20-25, 606:1-10; Trial Exs. 8, 29) and a 13 acre parcel of the 
Property. (R. 1739, Tr. 608:11-19; Trial Exs. 14, 29.) Despite having these several legal 
descriptions available to use for its Notice of Interest for smaller portions of the Property, 
CIC chose instead to record its lien on the Siggards' entire 38 acres. (Trial Ex. 22, 
Add. I.). 
6
 CIC attempted to justify filing its notice on all 38 acres because the Contract provided 
CIC with the right to "designate" the 16 acres it wanted, and therefore, CIC argued, since it 
had not designated what it wanted, it was entitled to lien the entire 38 acre parcel. 
(Appellant's Brief, 5; R. 1611, Tr. 166:5-15.) This sham was not lost on the jury. The jury 
heard evidence that Mr. Siggard had repeatedly requested CIC to designate the 16 acres 
(R. 1689, Tr. 407:22-25), that the commercial development was always intended to take 
place at one location, the intersection of 11400 South and 10th East (R. 1738-1739, 
Tr. 605:7-26, 606:1-10, 608:11-19) as all site plans had designated the area for the 
commercial development. (Trial Exs. 3, 8, 14, 29.) 
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Not only did CIC record the Notice of Interest on all 38 acres of the Siggard's 
property, CIC did not disclose that fact to the Siggards, making no mention of the Notice of 
Interest in the lawyer's letter of April 4, 1990 (Trial Ex. 23, Add. 2) or at any time 
thereafter. (R. 1692, Tr. 419:10-22.) CIC never told the Siggards that a Notice of Interest 
had been recorded against their property. (R. 1692, Tr. 419:10-22.) The Siggards 
subsequently discovered the Notice of Interest when CIC filed this lawsuit in August, 1992. 
(R. 1692, Tr. 419:10-22.) 
After the April 4, 1990 letter, the only communication CIC had with the Siggards 
occurred 30 to 60 days later when Busch, in a telephone discussion with Mr. Siggard, asked 
what Mr. Siggard intended to do with the property now that the Siggards "had the property 
back". (R. 1691, Tr. 415:1-7.) In the same conversation, Busch asked the Siggards to 
consider jointly developing the property in a partnership with him. (R. 1691, Tr. 415:22-25; 
416:1-22.) Mr. Siggard declined the offer. (R. 1691, Tr. 415:25, 416:1.) 
Approximately two years after recording its Notice of Interest on the Siggards 
property, CIC brought a lawsuit against the Siggards seeking monetary damages for an 
alleged breach of contract. (Complaint, R. 1-7.) On discovering that the Notice of Interest 
had been recorded, the Siggards demanded that CIC release the Notice of Interest wrongfully 
recorded against the property, as CIC's complaint sought only monetary damages and 
asserted no right or interest in the Property. (Trial Ex. 43, Add. O.) The Notice of Interest 
was not released however, and a year later CIC amended its complaint to include a claim for 
relief for specific performance of the Contract. (R. 295, 300-305.) The Siggards 
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counterclaimed seeking, among other things, damages for breach of contract and wrongful 
lien. (R. 466-480.) 
Additionally, "a week or ten days" before trial, (R. 1631, Tr. 245:17-23), and 5 
years and 5 months after the March 3, 1990 payment was due, and after identical payments 
of $56,000.00 each for March of 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995, totaling $280,000.00, 
(if the Contract had still been in force), had been ignored, CIC procured a Certificate of 
Deposit in its name in the amount of $56,000.00, which it used in trial as a trial exhibit. 
(Trial Ex. 40.) The stated purpose for the 1995 Certificate of Deposit was "to show that the 
money was very available" to make the overdue payment, due on March 3, 1990, five years 
before. (R. 1634, Tr. 257:12-18.)7 
The matter was tried to a jury in August, 1995. The jury returned a unanimous 
verdict in favor of the Siggards, specifically finding that CIC was not entitled to specific 
performance, was not excused from performing its contractual obligations under the 
Contract, and not entitled to assert an excuse because of waiver, estoppel and/or unclean 
hands. (R. 1023, 1024, Add. L.) The jury further found that the Siggards performed all 
7
 After judgment had been entered against CIC, Siggards attempted to garnish the assets 
of CIC's offered Certificate of Deposit for the $1,000.00 statutory penalty it had been 
awarded (R-1068-1071) and to restrain CIC from removing its only asset (the Certificate of 
Deposit), until a judgment on fees and costs had been obtained, for which the Siggards filed 
a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. (R. 1100-1105, 
1115-1118.) While the temporary restraining order was granted by Judge Iwasaki on August 
22, 1995, the Certificate of Deposit (which was to mature on August 28, 1995) had already 
been redeemed and the funds moved from CIC to one of the other Busch companies. 
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steps necessary to forfeit CIC's interest in the Contract and that CIC's Notice of Interest was 
a violation of the Utah Wrongful Lien Statute. (R. 1024, App. L.) 
CIC filed a Motion for New Trial, which Motion was denied by Judge Iwasaki, 
who found that CIC's arguments "were not compelling" and that "the evidence submitted to 
the jury at the trial of this case was sufficient to support the jury's findings that CIC's filing 
of the Notice of Interest violated the Utah Wrongful Lien Statute and that the Siggards 
performed all steps necessary to forfeit CIC's interest in the Real Estate Contract." 
(R. 1288-1290, App. N.) The judge subsequently awarded the Siggards its fees and costs of 
$17,325.00 as the prevailing party on the wrongful lien issue. (R. 1291-1295, App. P.) 
As the facts above demonstrate, the jury's verdict is supported by the evidence. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Standard of Review. To overturn a jury verdict, the court must first be 
persuaded that the evidence on which the jury based its unanimous decision so clearly 
preponderates in favor of CIC that reasonable people would not differ in finding for CIC.8 
The evidence the jury relied on does not so preponderate, and accordingly, the jury verdict 
must be affirmed. 
The Notice of Forfeiture. Although CIC has not appealed the jury's denial of 
specific performance, CIC in essence asks for specific performance now on appeal, and bases 
its request on the fact that CIC received notice of the Siggards' election of the forfeiture 
8
 Since the jury unanimously decided against CIC, overturning it would necessarily 
imply the members of the jury were not reasonable. 
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remedy two days before the cure period had actually expired. Relying on this technicality, 
CIC chooses to ignore the evidence the jury relied upon, namely that CIC received clear, 
unambiguous notice of its default by the March 5, 1990 default notice, understood exactly 
what it was required to do to cure the default and understood the consequence of a failure to 
cure the default. In the face of that understanding, CIC did nothing to cure its default within 
the time permitted by the Contract or at any time thereafter. Indeed, the evidence shows that 
CIC intentionally chose not to cure the default, relying upon its spurious claims that the 
Siggards were in breach of the contract, and therefore CIC's performance was excused. The 
jury found that this reliance was unwarranted, and it was CIC that had breached the contract, 
not the Siggards. 
The jury had abundant evidence on which it could base its verdict that the Siggards 
performed all the steps necessary to forfeit CIC's interest. The evidence before the jury was 
that CIC received clear and unambiguous notice of default, that CIC knew of its contractual 
obligation, that it knew it would forfeit its rights under the contract in 30 days unless it cured 
its default, and that despite receiving and understanding the notices of default, CIC 
intentionally made no attempt to cure its default. The evidence demonstrated to the jury that, 
knowing the risk of forfeiture, CIC chose to attempt to excuse its performance by asserting 
alleged breaches of Siggards' performance of the contract. These facts provide ample 
evidence to support the jury's verdict. 
The Wrongful Lien. Whether the recording of a particular lien is "groundless" is 
an issue of fact left solely to the jury to decide. The jury determined the credibility of the 
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evidence surrounding CIC's recording of the Notice of Interest on all 38 acres of the 
Siggards' parcel and determined that CIC's lien was not supported by credible evidence. 
While CIC now makes an argument for its action, that does not mean it had an "arguable 
basis," given the evidence. The evidence submitted to the jury demonstrated that CIC's 
claim, prior to forfeiture, was only to 16 acres, and that it had approximate legal descriptions 
for smaller portions of the 38 acre parcel, upon which it ultimately filed its Notice of Lien. 
Those legal descriptions had been prepared by CIC and designated the very area it intended 
to place its commercial development on the Property. Once forfeited, CIC had no legitimate 
claim to any of the property. The jury recognized the alternatives and the motive behind 
CIC's action and correctly determined that CIC's lien was groundless. Accepting, as the 
Court must, the inferences supporting the jury's verdict, the Court should affirm the jury's 
decision. 
Specific Performance. Before trial, CIC elected specific performance of the 
Contract as its sole remedy, and did not seek any alternative remedies or relief at trial. The 
jury expressly found that CIC was not entitled to specific performance, and CIC has not 
appealed that verdict. (Appellant's Brief 15.) Nevertheless, CIC, by this appeal, seeks a 
remedy that is indistinguishable from specific performance: to receive a new notice of default 
and a new opportunity to cure; as if the last six years never happened. CIC is not entitled to 
relief for a claim it has not appealed. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW REQUIRES THE APPELLATE COURT TO 
REVIEW THE EVIDENCE AND THE INFERENCES FROM THE 
EVIDENCE IN THE LIGHT MOST SUPPORTIVE OF THE VERDICT. 
CIC appeals the jury's unanimous verdict on two factual issues: Did the Siggards 
perform all steps necessary to declare CIC's interest under the contract forfeited; and was 
CIC's Notice of Interest groundless. On both issues CIC asks this Court to replace the jury's 
judgment, which was formed after hearing the evidence and evaluating the credibility of the 
witnesses, with its own interpretation of the facts. The standard required to compel such a 
decision, however, is very high and, in this case, is not met. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently reiterated the standard of review to be applied in 
reviewing a jury verdict. In Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461 (Utah 1996), 
the court stated that 
[i]n reviewing a jury verdict, we view the evidence in the light most 
supportive of the verdict, and assume that the jury believed those aspects 
of the evidence which sustain its findings and judgment. Accordingly, 
we will upset a jury verdict only upon a showing that the evidence so 
clearly preponderates in favor of the appellant that reasonable people 
would not differ on the outcome of the case. 
Id. at 467 (citations omitted). This standard is a "well- established principal of appellate 
review." Pratt v. Prodata. Inc.. 885 P.2d 786, 788 (Utah 1994). 
It is likewise well-established that, "it is the prerogative of the jury to resolve 
issues of fact," and that "accepted rules of appellate review preclude the appellate court from 
substituting its judgment for that of the jury on issues of fact." E.A. Strout Western Realty 
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v. W.C. Fov & Sons. 665 P.2d 1320, 1322 (Utah 1983). In reviewing a jury verdict the 
appellate court must defer to the jury and 
accept the evidentiary inferences that tend to support the verdict rather 
than contrary inferences that support the appellants' version of the facts, 
even if we might have judged those inferences differently had we been 
deciding the matter in the first instance, and not as an appellate court. 
Hodges v. Gibson Products Co.. 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 1991). 
Accordingly, before this Court may overturn the jury's verdict, CIC must 
demonstrate to the Court either that there was no evidence in support of the jury's unanimous 
verdict (because the court must "accept that testimony which supports the jury's verdict"), or 
that the evidence in support of the verdict "so clearly preponderates" in favor of CIC, "that 
reasonable people could not differ" in finding for CIC. Id at 156; Billings. 918 P.2d at 
467. 
Viewing the evidence and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence in a light 
most supportive of the verdict, and accepting the jury's resolution of the facts and the 
credibility of the evidence, this Court must affirm the jury's unanimous verdict on both 
issues CIC raises on appeal. The evidence supports the jury's unanimous decision on both 
issues, and does not so preponderate in CIC's favor that reasonable people could not differ in 
finding for CIC. 
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II. THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE JURY'S VERDICT THAT THE 
SIGGARDS TOOK THE STEPS NECESSARY TO FORFEIT CIC'S 
INTEREST UNDER THE CONTRACT, 
CIC argues that the Siggards' April 3, 1990 notice of CIC's failure to cure its 
default was defective because it was received two days prior to the technical end of the cure 
period. Because this second notice was two days early, CIC argues it should now be allowed 
a new notice of default and a new opportunity to cure, six years after its default and after the 
jury expressly rejected that remedy, and even though CIC has not appealed that finding.9 
A. The Evidence Demonstrated that CIC Received Appropriate Notice. 
Under the default provisions of the Contract, the Siggards, if electing to end the 
Contract and retain any payments already paid, were required first to provide written notice 
of CIC's default, stating that CIC had defaulted and had thirty days in which to cure the 
default. (Trial Ex. 7 f 18, Add. B.) Evidence was presented at trial, and it is an undisputed 
fact in the Record, that the Siggards provided, and CIC received, such notice by letter dated 
March 5, 1990 (Pretrial Order, R. 890, Add. K). The March 5, 1990 letter provided CIC 
with (i) clear, unambiguous notice of CIC's default, (ii) notice of the time period in which 
CIC had to cure its default, and (iii) notice of the Siggards' election of this specific remedy 
(Trial Ex. 20, Add. F). Accordingly, the letter of March 5, 1990 gave CIC all the 
substantive notice CIC was entitled to receive. Interestingly, in over six years since its 
default, CIC has never asserted or argued that the March 5, 1990 default letter was 
9
 In its brief CIC states: "Buyer does not dispute . . . that Buyer is not entitled to 
specifically enforce the contract." (Appellant's Brief, 15). 
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confusing, ambiguous or misleading in any way. It was not. Indeed, the evidence at trial 
demonstrated that CIC was fully aware of the March 5, 1990 default notice, its requirements 
and CIC's obligations thereunder. (R. 1611, Tr. 166:21-25; R. 1633, Tr. 251:24-25, 
252:1-2.) 
That CIC understood the terms of the March 5, 1990 notice of default is clear. 
Busch testified that he received and understood the March 5, 1990 notice. (R. 1633, 
Tr. 252:7-10.) CIC knew it had an obligation to pay $56,000.00 on or before March 3, 
1990- (R. 1614-1615, Tr. 178:24-25, 179:1-2.) The jury heard the testimony of Busch that, 
despite receiving and understanding the March 5, 1990 notice, CIC made no attempt 
whatsoever to make the required payment, to call or otherwise contact the Siggards to discuss 
making the payment, or attempt in any way to tender a cure of CIC's default. (R. 1690, 
Tr. 411:12-14.) Further, CIC knew that if it did not cure the default it would forfeit its 
rights under the contract (R. 1610-1611, Tr. 162:20-25, 163:1-15), and that the notice was a 
forfeiture notice. (R. 1611, Tr. 164:9-12.) 
B. The Evidence Demonstrated that the Early Notice to CIC Made No 
Difference in CIC's Actions. 
Under the terms of the contract, if CIC failed to cure its breach within the 
specified thirty days, the Siggards would provide a second notice of CIC's failure to cure and 
of the Siggards' election of the remedy terminating their obligations under the contract and 
allowing them to retain any amounts paid prior to default. (Trial Ex. 7 f 18, Add. B.) The 
second notice is a technical formality to finalize the substantive notice CIC previously 
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received and understood. The second notice requirement did not confer upon CIC any new 
benefit, the technical violation of which would cause harm to CIC in any manner. Indeed, 
the second notice merely acknowledged that CIC's default remained uncured during the 
required cure period and that further obligations between the parties under the contract were 
terminated. The second notice did not preclude CIC from attempting to cure its breach by 
tendering the $56,000.00 payment prior to the expiration of the 30 day cure period, and, 
consequently, its delivery two days prior to the end of the cure period did not harm CIC. 
CIC fully understood this, as Busch testified that even though the notice was two days early, 
CIC still could have cured the default. (R. 1633, Tr. 252:7-10.) 
Further, the jury received evidence that demonstrated that CIC had no intention of 
paying the $56,000.00 payment on March 3, 1990 or at any time during the cure period. 
(R. 1612, Tr. 167:12-25, 168:1.) The evidence showed that CIC sought to excuse its 
payment (R. 1612, Tr. 167:22-25), and otherwise took every action to avoid payment, rather 
than curing the default. (R. 1612, Tr. 167: 4-5.) 
On April 3, 1990, CIC received the Siggards' second notice, informing CIC of its 
failure to cure and of the Siggard's election of their remedy under the contract. (Trial Ex. 2, 
Add. G.) The jury again heard testimony from Busch that, rather than attempt to cure CIC's 
default by paying the amount which was then overdue, Busch delivered the second notice to 
his lawyer and had his lawyer respond by way of the April 4, 1990, letter (R. 1612, 
Tr. 167:4-5; Trial Ex. 23, Add. H.) 
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The April 4, 1990 letter from CIC's counsel was CIC's only response to the 
Siggards' notices and, tellingly, makes no reference to CIC's default or any intent to cure 
that default by tendering the amount due. Nor does it state any excuse for failing to make 
the payment. Instead, the April 4, 1990 letter claims the Siggards' notices were defective 
because they were not signed by the Siggards in their capacity as Trustees, and that the 
April 3, 1990 notice was two days early. (Trial Ex. 23; Add. H.) 
In its silence on CIC's obligation to cure its default by paying the amount due, the 
April 4, 1990 letter revealed much to the jury about CIC's intent toward the payment due on 
the Siggards' property. While CIC knew its obligation to pay $56,000.00 was due on 
March 3, 1990, CIC had repeatedly sought to avoid these annual interest payments. 
(R. 1687, Tr. 399:8-17; R. 1688, Tr. 405:2-7; R. 1612, Tr. 167:6-14.) In March, 1989 
when the very first payment was overdue, the Siggards had to provide CIC with a Notice of 
Default before CIC ultimately paid the first delinquent payment. (R. 1687, Tr. 399:8-17.) 
CIC made that payment grudgingly, and only after the Siggards had agreed to amend the 
Contract. (R. 1687, Tr. 399:18-23.) CIC also sought to defer the March 3, 1990 payment. 
(R. 1688, Tr. 405:2-7.) Even after receiving the April 3, 1990 Notice, CIC still sought to 
change the arrangement or create a new one. Mr. Siggard testified at trial that between 30 
and 60 days after CIC had not cured the default, CIC, through Busch, telephoned him and 
stated that "now that you (the Siggards) have the property back what are you going to do 
with it?" (R. 1690, Tr. 414:25; 415:1-7.) CIC, in that same conversation requested that 
Siggards and CIC develop the property together as partners. (R. 1691, Tr. 415:15-19.) The 
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evidence and the inferences a jury can draw from the evidence indicate that CIC never 
intended to pay the March 3, 1990 installment and belatedly sought to use the excuse that a 
survey had not been provided by the Siggards as the basis for its non-payment. (R. 1612, 
Tr. 167:22-25; 168:1.) CIC simply chose to believe that it did not have to make the 
payment to the Siggards (R. 1634, Tr. 257:1-11), and had no intention of making the 
payment. 
Most telling to the jury was the fact that CIC never made the $56,000.00 payment, 
and never even tendered the payment. (R. 1612, Tr. 167:1-18.) Within a month or two 
after the forfeiture, Busch acknowledged that the Siggards "had the property back" and 
sought to enter into two new arrangements with them. (R. 1681, Tr. 415:1-25.) The letter 
of April 4, 1990 was silent regarding payment or tender of payment. (Add. G.) That letter 
provided a golden opportunity for CIC to assure the Siggards that they would be paid the 
delinquent payment, but CIC did not attempt to cure its default in the two days remaining in 
the cure period, nor at any time in the two years before CIC sued the Siggards for $1 
million, nor in the next three years before this matter made its way to trial. (R. 1612, 
Tr. 167:12-18.) 
C. The Evidence Demonstrated that the Purpose of Notice Had Been 
Served. 
The purpose of requiring notice of a party's default of a real estate contract is to 
put the defaulting party on notice of what that party has failed to do, what he has to do to 
cure the default, and to provide a reasonable time in which the defaulting party may cure. 
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Where notice is not deficient in these areas, and the default remains uncured, forfeiture of 
any payments under a contract is appropriate. CIC claims that, in order to effectuate a 
forfeiture of a real estate contract, the forfeiting party must strictly comply with the notice 
provisions of the contract. CIC misconstrues, however, the intent and purpose of the notice 
requirement and ignores the distinction between substantive notice requirements and technical 
delivery requirements. 
The fact that CIC never attempted to tender a cure for its default distinguishes this 
case from those cases CIC cites as support for its appeal. The distinction between 
substantive and technical notice requirements and the necessity of actual tender of 
performance, although ignored by CIC, is clear in the cases CIC cites in support of its 
position. In Grow v. Marwick Dev. Inc.. 621 P.2d 1249 (Utah 1980), the sellers of real 
property appealed the district court's ruling that the buyers had not forfeited their interest 
under a uniform real estate contract. In that case, the sellers had sent two separate notices of 
default to the buyers, one in May, the next in June. Sellers followed in July with a notice of 
failure to cure the default and notice of forfeiture. In August, sellers sent a third notice of 
default giving the buyers another 15 days to correct the delinquency. Within the 15 days, 
buyers tendered a check for the delinquent amounts due, including interest. Two weeks 
later, sellers sent a second notice of failure to cure default and notice of forfeiture and later 
returned the earlier tendered payment. Id., 1251. 
Instead of holding that the notice of forfeiture to buyers was insufficient due to 
some technicality in delivery, as CIC argues in this case, the Grow court held that the notice 
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was defective because, in light of the several earlier notices, the August notice led the buyers 
to believe they had an extra 15 days to cure the default, a belief the buyers acted upon to 
their detriment. After receiving two default notices, then a forfeiture notice, then a third 
default notice granting more time to cure, the buyers in Grow were confused as to what the 
seller's position was and what was required of them. For that reason, the court held that the 
buyers were entitled to the additional 15 days to cure their default. Id., 1252. And since the 
buyers made the payment within those 15 days, it was appropriate to conclude that the 
buyer's interest had not been forfeited. 
The Grow facts are nothing like the facts in this case. In Grow the confusing and 
misleading nature of the notices made them defective; in this case, there was no substantive 
defect with the content of the notices given to CIC. Rather, the Siggards' March 5, 1990 
notice of default clearly stated that CIC was in default of its annual interest payment and that 
CIC had 30 days to cure that default. Unlike sellers in Grow, the Siggards did not send 
second or third notices of default, or grant additional trial to cure. Nor did they send CIC 
conflicting signals as to their intentions. Rather, the Siggards gave CIC clear and 
unambiguous notice of their intentions and, when no tender of a cure was made, the Siggards 
affirmatively stated their intent to terminate the contract. 
Unlike the buyers in Grow, despite receiving clear notice of default, CIC did not 
tender a cure within the requisite cure period and made no attempt to offer such cure at any 
time thereafter, not in the two days after the second notice, or ever. These facts distinguish 
this case from Grow. 
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Similarly distinguishable from this case is Adair v. Bracken. 745 P.2d 849 (Utah 
App. 1987). In Adair, the seller's escrow agent advised buyers, who had paid over two-
thirds of the purchase price, of a delinquency in their payments. The agent's letter did not 
mention the consequence of the buyers' failing to remit the past due amounts and did not 
inform buyers of seller's intent to pursue contractual remedies. Id., 850. After the first 
letter, neither the buyers nor the sellers did anything for five months. The escrow agent then 
sent a second letter stating that "it [w]as the intent of the Sellers...to demand that [the buyer] 
immediately arrange to pay off the entire balance" of the contract. Id. (Emphasis added.) 
The second letter requested a response from buyers in five days and stated that if no response 
was received, the sellers would exercise their contract option resulting in the forfeiture of the 
amounts already paid. Id. Despite their five-day threat, the sellers, again, took no action 
for several months, this time not until after the buyers had tendered the full amount of 
principal and interest then owing. Id. Just as in Grow, the sellers in Adair refused to accept 
the tender. 
Noting that only one of the two requisite notices was provided and that the only 
notice given "fatally omitted" essential substantive content, like the amount demanded, the 
Adair court held that the notice provided to the buyers was insufficient to terminate their 
contractual rights, particularly in light of the fact that sellers had tolerated several months of 
non-payment. Id. 853. The court noted that, because of the conflicting notices and sellers' 
acquiescence in buyers' non-payment, buyers "reasonably assumed their continued default 
was being tolerated." Id. 
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The Adair court did not find the notice defective based on a mere technicality, as 
CIC would have this Court do. Rather, the notices in Grow and Adair were substantively 
defective in their content. Those notices confused the buyers and omitted key substantive 
details. Those substantively defective notices were then negated by the buyers' affirmative 
showing of their intent to cure by their actual tendering of the full amount of delinquent 
payments due. CIC never made such affirmative showing. 
Again, the facts of this case are distinctly different from the facts in either Grow 
or Adair. CIC received substantive notice of its default and of what was required to cure 
that default. Despite that clear notice, and the later notice of the Siggards' intent to 
terminate the contract, CIC, unlike the buyers in Grow and Adair, made no attempt 
whatsoever to tender a cure. The evidence before the jury demonstrated that CIC did not 
call or write to the Siggards, or in any way tender their delinquent payment at any time 
between receipt of the March 5, 1990 and 28 days later when they received notice of the 
Siggards' intent to terminate the contract. (Tr. 411:12-14.) The evidence further showed 
that CIC made no tender of its delinquent payments in the two days following its receipt of 
the Siggards' second notice. (Tr. 252: 7-10.) The evidence and the inferences the jury can 
draw from the evidence additionally demonstrated that CIC did not want to make the annual 
payment (Tr. 167: 22-15, 168:1) and had twice, before the payment was due, attempted to 
restructure the contract to eliminate the required annual payments. (Tr. 409:24-25, 410:1.) 
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D* CIC's Argument Places Form Over Substance. 
Its argument, peeled down to its core, is that even if notice makes a defaulting 
party aware of its default and its requirements to cure, and even though no confusion exists 
on the part of the defaulting party, premature delivery of a later notice to inform the 
defaulting party of what it already knew negates the substantive sufficiency of the earlier 
notice, even where the defaulting party never tendered its cure within the cure period. Such 
a position is indefensible and CIC has failed to cite a single case supporting such an absurd 
conclusion. Such a rule would make bad law, inevitably leading to every defaulting party's 
finding a technical default in delivery to excuse its, even intentional, failure to perform. 
Several courts, however, have distinguished substantive notice requirements and technical 
delivery requirements, holding that where notice actually puts the party on notice of his 
default, a technical violation of a delivery requirement will not negate the effect of the 
substantive notice. 
Noting that "the law does not require a useless act that in no way would have 
changed the notice actually given," the court in Kopp's Rug Co. v. Talbot. 620 P.2d 1167, 
1170 (Kan. App. 1980), found that notice to homeowners of the filing of a lien on their 
property provided the necessary substantive notice, and was upheld as adequate notice even 
though delivery and service requirements of the lien statute were not strictly complied with. 
In Hill v. Johnson. 713 P.2d 493 (Mem. Dec. Kan. 1985) the court sustained the 
effectiveness of substantive, actual notice despite delivery not in accordance with contract 
terms. The California Court of Appeals has also held that substantial compliance with 
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default notice requirements in a property lease is sufficient. In that case, the court held that 
a three day notice of termination of a lease was sufficient despite a contractual requirement 
of five day notice, particularly in light of the fact that the lessees had made no attempt to 
comply with earlier notices of default and had failed to cure the defaults. Id., 627. 
Schulman v. Vera, 108 Cal. App. 3rd 552 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1980). The Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, reviewing a case from the District of Utah, has likewise held that 
substantial compliance with the notice provisions of a contract for the sale of mineral rights 
was sufficient notice, despite technical defects in the way the notice was given and received. 
Midwest Uranium Co. v. Craig, 215 F.2d 219, 221 (10th Cir. 1953). 
CIC received the substantive notice it was entitled to receive in the March 5, 1990 
notice of default. The second notice merely stated the fact that CIC had failed to cure its 
default as required under the Contract. CIC was not harmed by the two-day early delivery 
of that second notice. Busch even testified that CIC could have cured the default in the two 
days remaining in the cure period if CIC had chosen to. (R. 1633, Tr. 252:7-10.) But CIC 
did not cure its default. Instead, CIC had its lawyer record a Notice of Interest on the 
Siggard's property and send the April 4, 1990 letter. (R. 1612, Tr. 167:4-11.) The 
reasonable implication of this testimony and evidence is that CIC did not cure the default 
(pay the money undisputedly due) because CIC did not want to, preferring to have its 
lawyers tell the Siggards payment was not due because of some excuse. CIC's action, in the 
face of default and forfeiture, clearly demonstrates CIC's purpose to preserve a benefit to 
CIC, a continuing interest in the property of the contract, without paying for it, and relying 
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on a pretextual excuse to justify its failure to perform. The April 4, 1990 letter from CIC's 
attorney was calculated to provide just such a result: a pretextual excuse not to make the 
payment CIC did not want to pay. The Siggards did not ask for a letter of excuses; the 
Siggards asked CIC to merely do that which it was obligated to do—make the March 3, 1990 
payment or lose its right to any interest in the Contract. 
The jury saw through CIC's charade. It weighed the evidence and unanimously 
determined that the Siggards did what was required to put CIC on notice of its obligation to 
cure and the resultant consequence. The jury heard no evidence that CIC wanted to do 
something to cure its default; it heard only CIC's excuses to justify its default. CIC's actions 
are akin to the old adage that "you can lead a horse to water, but you can't make it drink." 
CIC was on notice of its obligations to cure its default, and refused to correct it. The 
excuses CIC concocted to beg off its performance were neither compelling to the jury, or to 
the judge. This evidence supports the jury's verdict against CIC, and, accordingly, the jury's 
verdict should be affirmed. 
E. CIC Seeks the Relief on Appeal the Jury Unanimously Rejected. 
As relief for its appeal, CIC unbelievably requests that it be given "a new notice of 
default and a new opportunity to cure." (Appellant's Brief, 29.) Simply put, CIC requests a 
remedy that the jury expressly rejected, and relief that CIC acknowledges it is not entitled to 
receive. (Appellant's Brief, 15.) To ask for this relief now, when CIC has not appealed the 
jury's denial of specific performance, is tantamount to asking this court to reinstate the 
Contract as if there had been no default, as if the six year dispute between these parties 
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never occurred, as if the world had stopped to hold its collective breath to see if CIC's 
excuses would work, and thereby allow CIC to make the payment it chose not to make on 
April 3, 1990. CIC's request ignores CIC's pre-trial election of specific performance as its 
sole remedy at trial. More importantly, it ignores the jury's verdict and the fact CIC did not 
appeal that verdict. CIC cannot have it both ways. Specific performance by any other name 
is still specific performance. That remedy was unanimously rejected by the jury and has not 
been appealed. CIC is asking the Court for a remedy that is wholly inconsistent with its 
prior decisions, the jury's verdict and the issues actually appealed. 
III. THE JURY'S VERDICT THAT CIC VIOLATED THE WRONGFUL LIEN 
STATUTE IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Under the Utah Wrongful Lien Statute, a lien recorded against real property 
violates the statute if it is "groundless." No Utah court has defined the term, but the Arizona 
Court of Appeals has defined a groundless lien as one either "without arguable basis" or "not 
supported by credible evidence." Evergreen West, Inc. v. Boyd, 810 P.2d 612 (Ariz. App. 
1991). In this case, Judge Iwasaki instructed the jury on this point of law. (R. 1017, Jury 
Ins. 43.) On appeal, CIC has focused its argument on the "arguable basis" test of the 
groundlessness of its lien. It is apparent from the record, however, that the jury applied the 
"not supported by credible evidence" test in finding CIC's notice of interest groundless. 
Whether the recording of a lien is arguable or supported by credible evidence is a 
question of fact for the jury to decide. Coventry Homes, Inc. v. Scottscom Partnership, 155 
Ariz. 215, 745 P.2d 962, 966 (Ariz. App. 1987). It is the "prerogative of the jury to resolve 
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issues of fact" (Jury Ins. 6, R. 981) and to weigh the credibility of evidence. E.A. Strout 
Western Realty v. W.C. Fov & Sons, 665 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1983). (R. 981, Jury Ins. 6; 
R. 985, Jury Ins. 10.) While the jury heard CIC's "arguable basis" argument, in light of the 
other evidence presented at trial, the jury apparently did not find CIC's arguable basis theory 
credible. Rather, the jury was persuaded that there was no credible evidence supporting the 
lien on the Siggards' property, particularly in light of substantial evidence showing that 
i) CIC wanted out of its contract obligations at the time CIC filed its notice of interest, 
ii) CIC had no intention of developing any of the property except those acres closest to the 
intersection, and that iii) CIC's argument for not designating the property it wanted to 
develop was a pretext. 
Substantial evidence, in addition to that cited by CIC, supports the jury's verdict: 
1. The Contract, as amended, restricted CIC to the purchase of 16 
acres of the 38-acre parcel (Trial Ex. 17, Add. D); 
2. In April, 1988, CIC submitted a legal description for the 18 acres in 
the northwestern-most corner of the Siggards' 38-acre parcel closest to 11400 
South and 1000 East as the property CIC intended to develop and for which it 
sought commercial zoning (R. 1738, Tr. 605:7-19; Trial Exs. 3, 29); 
3. In November, 1988 CIC submitted a second legal description to 
Sandy City which again described the 16 acres in the northwestern-most corner, 
closest to the intersection of 11400 South and 1000 East, as the property CIC 
intended to develop (R. 1738, Tr. 605:20-25, 606:1-10; Trial Exs. 8, 29); 
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4. Pursuant to CIC's request, Sandy City approved, first in January 
1989 and finally in August 1989, commercial zoning for 13 acres of the Siggard's 
38 acre parcel, which 13 acres are in the northwestern-most corner of the parcel 
closest to 11400 South and 1000 East, in the very location CIC had proposed to 
build its commercial development (R. 1739, Tr. 608:11-19, Trial Exs. 14, 29); 
5. CIC had possession of the legal description of the commercially 
zoned portion of the Siggards' property as early as January 1989 and could have 
therefore easily limited its Notice of Interest to those acres CIC had an interest in 
developing (Trial Ex. 13); 
6. Throughout the entire period CIC was involved with the proposed 
development project CIC always intended to locate its project on the northwest 
corner of the Siggard's property closest to 11400 South and 1000 East (R. 1738, 
Tr. 605:7-25, 606:1-10, Trial Exs. 3, 8, 13, 14, 29); 
7. CIC filed the Notice of Interest one day prior to the forfeiture of 
CIC's interest in the Property (Trial Ex. 22); 
8. CIC, through Busch, acknowledged after forfeiture that the Property 
was the Siggards', and sought to create a new agreement with them (R. 1691, Tr. 
415:1-25); 
9. Even at the date of trial, CIC still refused to designate the property 
it desired to purchase; and 
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10. CIC never informed the Siggards that it had filed a Notice of 
Interest on their property, nor did CIC ever provide the Siggards a copy of the 
Notice of Interest (R. 1692, Tr. 419:10-22); 
11. In September, 1992, after CIC filed the lawsuit and two years after 
CIC had recorded the Notice of Interest, when the Siggards first discovered the 
lien, CIC refused to release the lien despite the Siggard's demand. (Trial Ex. 43, 
Add. O.) 
This evidence, and the inferences the jury can draw from this evidence, support the 
jury's verdict that the lien was groundless. Additionally, the jury heard evidence that, as of 
the expiration of the thirty days to cure, on April 5, 1990, all of CIC's right and interest in 
the Property had been forfeited. The retention of a lien on property for which CIC had no 
legal right, which it had lost by its own failure to cure its known default, made the lien 
groundless. 
At trial, CIC attempted to convince the jury that it could not designate the property 
it wanted because it did not have a survey from the Siggards. The jury had evidence that 
this claim was pretextual and ruled against CIC. Viewing the evidence "in the light most 
supportive of the verdict," and deferring to the jury's determination of the credibility of the 
evidence and questions of fact, it is clear that the jury found no credible evidence supporting 
CIC's recording its lien over the Siggard's entire 38 acre parcel. The evidence presented at 
trial did not "so clearly preponderate" in favor of CIC so as to require the setting aside of 
the jury's unanimous verdict. 
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A. The Verdict Is Not Against the Law. 
As if the factual evidence were not enough to sustain the jury's verdict, the law as 
set forth in the jury instructions and ultimately applied by the jury, also favors the jury's 
determination that CIC violated the wrongful lien statute. In Bianco v. Patterson, 768 P.2d 
204 (Ariz. App. 1989), the Arizona Court of Appeals upheld a lower court's ruling that a 
lien was groundless on facts very similar to the facts of this case. In Bianco, the purchaser 
of real property filed a lis pendens against the seller's entire 1800 acres, despite the 
contract's limiting the purchaser's interest to a designated 40-acre parcel. The Arizona Court 
of Appeals found that the lis pendens should have covered only the 40-acre parcel, even 
though the purchaser had a contractual right to purchase a greater portion of the property. 
Id., 206. The mere fact that a party may have a contractual right does not give that party an 
"arguable" basis to file a lien on portions of the property in which the purchaser has no 
interest. 
Similar to the facts in Bianco, CIC recorded a lien on property it was not entitled 
to purchase under the Contract. The evidence showed CIC knew the acres it desired to 
purchase, and had no intention of purchasing or developing the remainder. Although the 
right to designate the acres it wanted became a convenient excuse for its wrongful lien, the 
jury saw past the ruse and found the other evidence credible. 
The jury, properly instructed in the law, and after reviewing the facts of this case, 
rejected CIC's arguments, as was its prerogative. The jury did not reach the wrong decision. 
The jury heard evidence from both parties and, judging the credibility of that evidence as 
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instructed by the court, unanimously found that CIC's lien on the Siggards' 38 acre parcel 
was in violation of the Utah Wrongful Lien Statute. The unanimous nature of the jury's 
decision suggests that the evidence CIC presented at trial did not "so clearly preponderate" in 
favor of CIC that reasonable people would not differ in finding for CIC. In fact, they found 
just the opposite; they did not differ in finding for the Siggards. The evidence at trial, 
especially when viewed in light "most supportive of the verdict" should be affirmed on this 
appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
CIC has not met its burden of showing that the evidence presented at trial so 
clearly preponderates in CIC's favor that reasonable people could not disagree in finding for 
CIC. On its face, and particularly in a light most favoring the verdict, the evidence on both 
issues appealed abundantly supports the jury's verdict. The verdict should therefore stand 
and CIC's appeal should be dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted this 7th day of October, 1996. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & 
MCDONOUGH 
Randall N. Skanchy 
Scott D. Cheney 
Attorneys for Don and Glenna F. Siggard 
as Trustees of the Don and Glenna F. 
Siggard Family Trust 
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ADDENDUM 
ADDENDUM 
Several of the documents included in this addendum are also included in the 
Addendum to Appellant's Brief. They are included here for convenience off the court. In 
this Addendum, each document is separately lettered. The corresponding Trial Exhibit 
Number or citation to document in the record is noted where applicable: 
Addendum Description Trial Exhibit/Record 
A. Earnest Money Agreement Tr. Ex. 1 
B. Real Estate Contract - August 1988 Tr. Ex. 7 
C. Letter Notice of Default from Siggard Tr. Ex. 16 
to CIC March 6, 1989 
D. Amendment to Real Estate Contract - Tr. Ex. 17 
March 30, 1989 
E. Annual Interest Payment - Check Stub Tr. Ex. 18 
F. March 5, 1990 Notice of Default Tr. Ex. 20 
Letter 
G. April 3, 1990 Notice of Termination Tr. Ex. 21 
of Contract 
H. April 4, 1990 Counsel's Letter to Tr. Ex. 23 
Siggards 
Tr. Ex. 22 
Tr. Ex. 27 
R. 882-100 
R. 1023-1025 
R. 1064-1067 
R. 1288 - 1290 
O. Letter demanding Release of Lien Tr. Ex. 43 
September 8, 1992 
P. Order Awarding Judgment Against R. 1291-1295 
CIC for Attorneys Fees and Costs, 
dated November 9, 1995 
I. 
J. 
K. 
L. 
M. 
N. 
Notice of Interest 
Letter from Michael Aldrich 
December 7, 1993 
Pre-Trial Order 
Special Verdict 
Judgment Dated August 18, 1995 
Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for 
New Trial 
Tab A 
:
 Yes<X) Not.0) EARNEST MONEY RECEIKI 
DATE M a r c h 3 . \988 
Hie undersigned Buyer _ 
flNEST MONEY, the amount of 
•rm of a p r o m i s s o r y n o t e 
Busch C o r p o r a t i o n a n d / o r a s s i g n s 
F i v e T h o u s a n d and N o / 1 0 0 
, hereby deposits w.ih Brokerage 
_ Dollars <$ 5 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 
. which shall be deposited m accordance with applicable State La* 
Received by N/A 
Phone Number 
OFFER TO PURCHASE 
1 PROPERTY DESCRIPT ION The above stated EARNEST MONEY is given to secure and apply on the pur 
hnOO E a s t , S a n d y , U t a h m the City of . Sandy . County of S a l t L a k e Utah. IJOOO 
Eject to any restrictive covenants, zoning regulations utility or other easements or rights of way. government patents or state deeds of record approved by Buyer 
Accordance with Section G Said property .s more particularly described as. S o u t h e a s t c o r n e r o f 1 1 4 0 0 S o u t h 1000 E a s t , S a n d y , U t a h 
ftpfl£QXimatQlv 2 0 + a c r e s ( t o be zoned c o m m e r c i a l ) . _ _ _ . 
[CHECK APPLICABLE 8 0 X E S 
• fj U N I M P R O V E D REAL PROPERTY D Vacant Lot 23 Vacant Acreage Q Other 
0 I M P R O V E D REAL PROPERTY Q Commercial Q Residential Q Condo Q Other 
(a) Included items. Unless excluded below, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the items shown m Section A if presently anached to the property 
The following personal property shall also be included in this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title None 
(b) Excluded items. The following items are specifically excluded from this sale None 
[c) C O N N E C T I O N S . UTILITIES ANO OTHER RIGHTS. Seller represents that the property includes the following improvements in the purchase pnce J 
^Dpublic sewer Oconnected 
0septic tank Q connected 
0other sanitary system 
^publ ic water Q connected 
Qpnvate water O connected 
Dwe l l O connected Q other 
Q irrigation water / secondary system 
« of shares Company . 
Q TV antenna Q master antenna Q prewired 
S t a t u r a l gas G connected 
^ e l e c t r i c i t y D connected 
Q ingress & egress by private easement 
.^dedicated road C p a v e d ^ J \ Q 
r /<pcurb and gutter A)cft**- « - ^ < f 
p o t h e r rights a n y now h e l d by S e l l e r 
G3sh Survey A certified survey a all be furnished at the expense of . S e l l e r prior to closing, O shall not be furnished 
Buyer Inspection. Buyer has made a visual inspection of the properly and subject to Section 1 (c) above and 6 below, accepts >: m its present physical 
condition, except No e x c e p t i o n s ; > 
2. P U R C H A S E PRICE A N D F I N A N C I N G . The total purchase price for the property is * S33.QQO POT a g r g < ? 9 n e ^ c o m m e r c i a l ) 
L . Dollars (• . ) which shall be paid as follows 
s.ooo.no 
ifl.ono.flo 
- 0 -
-0-
! -0-
L -o -
' Soe Above 
which represents the aforedescrtbed EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT: 
representing the approximate balance of CASH D O W N PAYMENT at dosing. 
representing the approximate balance of an existing mortgage, trust deed note, reei estate contract or other encumbrance to be assumed 
by buyer, which obligation bears interest at % per annum with monthly payments of * -
which include: 0 principal. Q interest; O taxes; O insurance; Qcondo fees: O other 
representing the approximate balance of an additional existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrances to be 
assumed by Buyer, which obligation bears interest at % per annum with monthly payments of % 
which include: Opr incipal D interest: Otaxes; Q insurance. Ocondo fees; Oother 
representing balance, if any. including proceeds from a new . loan, to be paid as follows Sale to close on a ten 
year Trust Deed and Note with IPS annual Interest payments commencing one year fro* the date this 
agreement Is accepted by Seller. Seller to release requested acreage to Buyer for 135,000 per 
0lher acre. Closing to take place within 30 days of commercial zoning and site plan approval by 
Sandy City. This offer will terminate If Buyer and Seller agree that there is no commercial zoning 
TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE availability on said property. Buyer will identify approximate boundaries of 
the proposed commercial zoning on or before June 3, 1988. 
ff Buyer is required to assume an underlying obligation and' or obtain outside financing. Buyer agrees to use best efforts to assume and/or procure same and this 
r *$ made subject to 8uyer qualifying for and lending institution granting said assumption and /o r financing Buyer agrees to make application within L 
Rafter Seller s acceptance of this Agreement, to assume the underlying obligation and/or obtain the new financing at an interest rate not to exceed ' % 
W*r does not qualify for the assumption and/or financing within " / A days after Seller $ acceptance of this Agreement, this Agreement shall be voidable 
an of the Buyer or Seller upon written notice 
agrees to pay $ towards Buyer s total financing and closing costs, including but not limited to. loan discount points 
1thi$ Agreement involves the assumption of an existing loan or obligation on the property. Section f shall apply 
&• hvo of a four p t y e form \ Seller's Initials Buyer's Initial Oate 3/s 
aht - e n t w , t n a n a t ,o f ney s opinion (? ecnon H) 
PACTION OF TITLE. In accordance w i * Section G. Buyer shall have the opportunity to inspect the title to the subiect property
 Dr l0r 
oke Mle subject to any existing restrictive covenants. >nc)ud»ng condominium resincuons (CC & Rs) Suyer O has Q has not r e v . ^ l ^ * „ C9 
[ 4 Bs pnor to signing th.s Agreement W a n y c o ndo-
ISTING OF TITLE. Title shall vest tn Buyer as follows As d i r e c t e d a t c l o s i n g 
;LLER WARRANTIES. In addition to warranties contained in Section C. the following .terns are also warranted No o t h e r 
^
 t 0 the above and Section C shall be limited to the following No e x c e p t i o n s 
peClAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTINGENCIES. This offer is made subject to the followmg special conditions and/or contingencies which must 
^ pnor to closing Proper commercial zoning for s t r i p shopping center. Proper access to e x i s t i n g u t i l i t y
 ?nH 
rnaduavs. Buyer** approval of survey and s o i l s f o s t . 
ROSING OF SALE. This Agreement shall be closed on or before March 3 19 89 at a reasonable location to be designated by 
^ c t to Section Q Upon demand Buyer shall deposit with the Escrow Closing Office all documents necessary to complete the ourchase m accordance 
Agreement Prorations set forth m Section R. shall be made as of G date of possession % date of closing Q other 
POSSESSION. Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer on acres* as paid o f f
 unless extended by written agreement of pan.es 
GENERAL PROVISIONS/ Unless otherwise indicated above, the General Provision Sections on the reverse side hereof are incorporated into this 
pi by reference 
AGREEMENT TO PUR 
5:00 
A^CCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the property on the above terms and conditions Seller 
to accept this offer Unless accepted, this offer shall lapse and the Agent shall ieturn the 
of Buyer BttSerT ndrew J . Wal ton Date Signature of Buyer Date 
•TANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above 
BTfON Seller hereby REJECTS the foregoing offer (Seller s Initials) 
f£R OFFER Seller hereby accepts the foregoing offer SU8JECT TO the exceptions or modifications as specified below or in the anached Addendum and 
i said COUNTER OFFER for Buyer s acceptance Buyar shall have until {A.M./P.M.) . 19 to accept the terms 
I below 
Signature of Seller v Opy/a&Qgart Signature of Seller 
p accepts the counter offer 
ir accepts with modifications on attached addendum 
(AM-PM) Signature of Buyer Signature of Buyer 
MMISSION The undersigned hereby agrees to pay to: 
Lssion of *lh. _ 
N/A 
. as consideration for the efforts m procuring a buyer 
N/A ' '' 
jre of Seller Oate Signature of Seller 
(Brokerage) 
Oate 
1 OOCUMENT RECEIPT Law requires Broker to furnish 8uyer and Seller with copies of this Agreement bearing ai/ygnaturcs (One of the following alternatives must therefore 
Ipfeted) 
I I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures 
ruRE0FS
*
£R
 ;A/ar 
* - , 5^^- ^j^~ 
SIGNATUR 
SUSCH jJr 
Oate 
IL^Twl MM/fMStMM Oate 
3' personally caused a final copy of the foregoing 
d Man and return receipt attached hereto to the O 
Oate •^" 'Andrew J . WafttA 
Agreement bearing all signatures to be mailed nn/ / 
3 Seller Q Buyei Sent by \-J-
Oate 
ifrjfa-
19. bv 
|»ree of a four page form ^ Seller s Initials (Q&% ) i/Hy, Data ^>/**/^O Buyer's Initials n... 3.A/& 
EARNf H" MONEY SALES AGR ".MENT 
Legend Yes (X) No (0) 
This is a legally binding contract Read the entire document carefully before signing 
REALTOR1 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
(Sections) 
INCLUDED ITEMS Unless excluded herein this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the following items if presently attached to the property plumbing 
jir-conditionmg and ventilating fixtures and equipment water heater built m appliances light fixtures and bulbs bathroom fixtures curtains and drapene4 
L window and door screens storm doors window blinds awnings installed television antenna wail to wall carpets water softener automatic garage doo 
and transmitters) fencing trees and shrubs 
9 
^INSPECTION Unless otherwise indicated Buyer agrees thai Buyer is purchasing said property upon Buyer s own examination and judgment and not b< 
fy any representation madt to Buyer by Seller or the Listing or Selling Brokerage as to its condition size location present value future value mcomi 
L or as to its production Buyer accepts the property m as is condition subject to Seller s warranties as outlined »n Section 6 In the event Buyer desire 
pnonaJ inspection said inspection shall be allowed by Seller but arranged for and paid by Buyer 
f 
rSCLLER WARRANTIES Seller warrants thai (a) Seller has received no claim nor notice of any building or toning violation concerning the property whici 
I or will not be remedied prior to closing (b) all obligations against the property including taxes assessments mortgages liens or other encumbrance 
liture shall be brought current on or before closing, and (c) the plumbing heating air conditioning and ventilating systems electrical system and appliance 
[sound or in satisfactory working condition at closing 
CONDITION OF WELL Seller warrants thai any private well serving the property has to the best of Sellers knowledge provided an adequate supply c 
" continued use of the well or wells is authonied by • state permit or other legal water right f FINDITION OF SEPTIC TANK Seller warrants that any septic tank serving the property is to the best of Seller s knowledge in good working order an no knowledge of any netdad repairs and it meets all applicable government health and construction standards 
ACCELERATION CLAUSE No later than fifteen (15) days after Seller s acceptance of this Agreement but not less than three (3) days prior to closm< 
jhell provide to Buyer written verification as to whether or not any notes, mongages deeds of trust or reef estate contracts against the property require it 
I of the holder of such instrument(s) to the safe of the property or permit the holder to raise the interest rate and/or declare the entire balance due m tr 
jf sale If any such document so provides and holder does not waive the same or unconditionally approve the sale then within three (3) days after notice i 
iver or disapproval or on the date of dosing, whichever is earlier Buyer shall have the option to dedare this Agreement null and void by giving written notu 
w or Seller s agent in such case ail earnest money received under this Agreement shall be returned to Buyer It is understood and agreed that if provtstor 
I Due on Sale clause are set forth in Section 7 herstn. alternatives allowed herein shall become null and void 
TITLE INSPECTION No later then fifteen (15) days after Seller s acceptance of this Agreement but not less than three (3) days prior to closing Buy 
•ve the opportunity to inspect either an abstract of title brought current with an attorney s opinion or a preliminary title report on the subject propert 
shall have a period of three (3) days after receipt thereof to examine and accept If Buyer does not accept Buyer shall give written notice thereof to Sell 
fc*s agent within the prescribed time period specifying objections to title Thereafter Seller shall be required through escrow at closing to cure ti 
jti to which Buyer has obiected if said defect(s) is not curable through an escrow agreement at closing, this Agreement shall be null and void at the optu 
Buyer and all monies received herewith shall be returned to the respective parties 
TITLE INSURANCE If title insurance is elected Seller authorizes the Listing Brokerage to order a preliminary commitment for a standard form ALl 
of title insurance to be issued by such title insurance company as Seller shall designate Title policy to be issued shall contain no exceptions other th 
provided for m sa<d standard form and the encumbrances or defects excepted under the final contract of sale If title cannot be made so insurable throuc 
row agreement at dosing the earnest money shall unless Buyer elects to waive such defects or encumbrances be refunded to Buyer and this Agreeme 
Mreupon be terminated Seller agrees to pay any cancellation charge 
L EXISTING TENANT LEASES If Buyer is to take title subject to an existing lease or leases Seller agrees to provide to Buyer no later than fifteen (15) da 
•Iter s acceptance of this Agreement but not less than three (3) days prior to closing a copy of all existing leases (and any amendments thereto) affecti 
oeny Unless written objection is given by Buyer to Seller or Seller s agent within three (3) working days thereafter Buyer shall take title subject to su 
f objection is not remedied within the stated time this Agreement shall be null and void 
CHANGES OURING TRANSACTION During the pendency of this Agreement Seller agrees that no changes m any existing leases shall be made n 
>ses entered mto nor shall any substantial alterations or improvements be made or undertaken without the written consent of the Buyer 
\ 
ONE OF A FOUR PAGE FORM 
^0R , T Y ®* SIGNATORS if Buyer or Seller is a corporation partnership trust estate or other entity the person executing th s Agreement on itj 
«nts h s or her authority to do so and to b»nd Buyer or Seller 
j |pl£TE AGREEMENT — NO VER8AL AGREEMENTS This instrument constitutes the entire Agreement between the parties and supersedes and 
Jjnd a" Pr ,0f negotiations representations warranties understandings or agreements between the part.es There are no verbal agreements which modify 
, agreement This Agreement cannot be changed except by mutual written agreement of the parties 
^ N T E R OFFERS Any counter offer made by Seller or Buyer shall be m writing and if attached hereto shall incorporate all the provisions of this 
Waal e*Pressly modified or excluded therein 
:/UJLT/INTERPLEADER AND ATTORNEY S FEES In the event of default by Buyer Seller may elect to either retain the earnest money as liquidated 
w institute suit to enforce any rights of Seller In the event of default by Seller or if this sale fails to close because of the nonsatisfaction of any 
jiUon or contingency to which the sale is subject pursuant to this Agreement (other than by virtue of any default by Buyer) the earnest money deposit 
irned to Buyer Both parties agree that should either party default in any of the covenants or agreements herein contained the defaulting party shall 
j and expenses including a reasonable attorney s fee which may arise or accrue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement or m pursuing any 
,ded hereunder or by applicable law whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise In the event the principal broker holding the earnest 
^t is required to file an interpleader action in court to resolve a dispute over the earnest money deposit referred to herein the Buyer and Seller 
r principal broker to draw from the earnest money deposit an amount necessary to advance the costs of bringing the interpleader action The amount 
Rgrnainmg after advancing those costs shall be interpleaded into court in accordance with state law The Buyer and Seller further agree that the defaulting 
R j y the court costs and reasonable attorney s fees incurred by the principal broker in bringing such action 
MOGATION Execution of a final real estate contract if any shall abrogate this Agreement 
Sj( OF LOSS All risk of loss or damage to the property shall be borne by the Seller until closing In the event there <s loss or damage to the property 
date hereof and the date of closing by reason of fire vandalism flood earthquake or acts of God and the cost to repair such damage shall exceed 
(10%) of the purchase price of the property 8uyer may at his option either proceed with this transaction if Seller agrees in writing to repair or 
Inaged property prior to closing or declare this Agreement null and void If damage to property is less than ten percent (10%) of the purchase price 
agrees m writing to repair or replace and does actually repair and replace damaged property prior to closing this transaction shall proceed as agreed 
j 
PIE IS OF ESSENCE—UNAVOIOA8LE DELAY In the event that this sale cannot be closed by the date provided herein due to interruption of transport 
flood extreme weather governmental regulations acts of God or similar occurrences beyond the control of Buyer or Seller then the closing date shall 
[d seven (7) days beyond cessation of such condition but in no event more than thirty (30) days beyond the dosing date provided herein Thereafter 
ma essence This provision relates only to the extension of closing date Closing shall mean the date on which all necessary instruments ara signed 
by ail parties to the transaction 
LOSING COSTS. Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-haH (1 /2 ) of the escrow closing fee unless otherwise required by the lending institution Costs 
(g title insurance or an abstract brought current shall be paid by Seller Taxes and assessments for the current year insurance if acceptable to the Buyer 
merest on assumed obligations shall be prorated as set forth in Section 8 Unearned deposits on tenancies and remaining mortgage or other reserves 
igned to Buyer at closing 
, PROPERTY CONVEYANCING If this agreement is for conveyance of fee title title shall be conveyed by warranty deed free of defects other than 
xed herein If this Agreement is for sale or transfer of a Seller s interest under an existing real estate contract Seller may transfer by either (a) special 
containing Seller s assignment of said contract in form sufficient to convey after acquired title or (b) by a new real estate contract incorporating the 
Ml estate contract therein 
fsENCY DISCLOSURE. Selling Brokerage may have entered into an agreement to represent the Seller 
OKERAGE For purposes of this Agreement any references to the term Brokerage shall mean the respective listing or selling reel estate office 
DAYS For purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term days shall mean business or working days exclusive of legal holidays 
OUR OF A FOUR PAGE FORM. THIS FORM HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION 
TabB 
REAL ESTATE CONTRACT ^d? 
This Contract is made and entered into this day of 
'^ <A-M^ y, 1988 by and between Don Siggard and Glenna F. Siggard, 
, / Trustees ("Sellers"), whose address is 3318 Oakcliff Drive, 
Jk/ Holladay, Utah 84124 and Commercial Investment Corporation, a 
Utah corporation ("Buyer"), whose address is 5250 South 300 West, 
Suite 100, Murray, Utah 84107. 
RECITALS: 
A. On March 3, 1988, Sellers and Busch Corporation and/or 
assigns entered into an Earnest Money Sales Agreement for the 
purchase of approximately 20 acres real property to be zoned 
commercial. Busch Corporation has assigned all of its right, 
title and interest in the Earnest Money Sales Agreement to Buyer. 
8. Pursuant to the terms of the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement, Buyer has no obligation to close until: (1) Sandy City 
has approved Buyer's site plan and commercial zoning; (2) Buyer 
has verified proper access to existing utilities and public 
roadways: and (3) Buyer has approved the survey. 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises, the mutual 
promises contained herein and other good and valuable 
consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby 
acknowledged, the parties agree as follows: 
1. Property. Sellers agree to sell and Buyer agrees to 
buy approximately 20 acres of real property (the "Property") 
located at the southeast corner of 11400 South 1000 East, in the 
City of Sandy, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, which Property 
is part of: 
The Northwest Quarter of the Southeast 
Quarter of Section 20, Township 3 South, 
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
excepting therefrom the following: Beginning 
North 0#07f30" West 1327.82 feet from the 
South quarter corner of said Section 20; and 
running thence North 0*07f30" West 180.84 
feet; thence North 89°52'30" East 456 feet; 
thence South 0°07f30" East 183.58 feet more 
or less; thence North 89•46f51" West 456 feet 
more or less to the point of beginning. 
Buyer shall have the exclusive right to identify the boundaries 
of the Property it is purchasing which boundaries shall not 
exceed the boundaries delineated on Exhibit "A." Buyer agrees 
that it will not purchase property and identify boundaries 
thereto which encompass all of the frontage to the property along 
11400 South; Sellers shall retain sufficient frontage on 11400 
South to have direct access to its proposed residential 
development as set forth on the Crescent Village Community 
ss. 
Shopping Center Site Plan, a copy of which is attached hereto as 
Exhibit A. 
2. Price and Payment. 
A. Buyer agrees to pay Sellers for the Property the 
purchase price of Thirty Five Thousand Dollars ($35,000.00) per 
acre payable at Sellers' address above given, or Sellers' order 
on the following terms: 
Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) ("Down 
Payment"), receipt of which is hereby 
acknowledged; and Buyer shall pay annual 
interest payments beginning March 3, 1989 and 
continuing on the 3rd day of each March 
thereafter until March 3, 1998 at which time 
the entire unpaid principal balance together 
with accrued interest shall be paid in full. 
Interest shall accrue on the unpaid balance 
at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum. 
Interest to accrue from March 3, 1988. 
B. The parties agree to deposit the Down Payment with 
Lvanc3mark Title Company and hereby instruct Landmark Title Company 
to deposit the Down Payment in its interest bearing Trust 
Account. The Down Payment, with the accrued interest, shall be 
disbursed to Sellers upon the execution of a Trust Deed and Note 
and Warranty Deed as required by Paragraph 3 below. In the event 
Buyer duly rescinds this Contract, then the principal of the Down 
Payment shall be returned to Buyer and the interest accrued 
thereon shall be paid to Sellers. 
C. The Installment Note in the amount of $5,000.00, 
which was attached to the Earnest Money Sales Agreement as part 
of the Down Payment, is hereby cancelled. 
3. Merger of Contract Into Deed and Trust Deed and Note. 
Within forty-five (45) days after Buyer obtains from Sandy City 
the commercial zoning and site plan approval for the Property, 
the parties agree to terminate this Contract and merge this 
Contract into a Warranty Deed, Trust Deed and Note. Buyer shall 
execute and deliver to Sellers a Trust Deed and Note and Sellers 
shall execute and deliver to Buyer a Warranty Deed. Buyer shall 
give Sellers written notice so that parties can select a mutually 
convenient date for the termination of this Contract and 
execution o£ the Warranty Deed, Trust Deed, and Note. Copies of 
the Warranty Deed, Trust Deed and Note are attached hereto as 
Exhibits "B", "C" and "D" respectively and by this reference made 
a part hereof. 
4. Partial Releases. Sellers agree to partially release 
their security interest in the Property and convey a Warranty 
Deed to Buyer for such released property upon payment under this 
^ 
,^Sy 
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Contract of $35,000.00 towards principal per acre- Sellers agree 
to execute such releases and warranty deeds at the request of 
Buyer, Buyer may make such request at any such time as any 
principal payments are made, 
5. Date of Possession. Sellers agree to deliver to Buyer 
possession and Buyer agrees to enter into possession of each acre 
of the Property upon merger of this Contract into Deed, Trust 
Deed, and Note as set forth in Paragraph 3 above. 
6. Risk of Loss. All risk of loss and destruction of the 
Property shall be borne by Sellers until Buyers take possession 
of the Property. 
7. Conveyance of Title. Sellers, on receiving the 
payments herein reserved to be paid at the time and in the manner 
specified herein, agree to execute and deliver to Buyer, or its 
assigns, a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying the title 
to the Property free and clear of all encumbrances except those 
which have accrued by or through the acts or neglect of Buyer and 
subject to the exceptions to title that are contained in the 
Commitment described in Section 8. 
8. Evidence of Title. Sellers shall provide Buyer with a 
Preliminary Commitment for Title Insurance ("Commitment'1) on the 
Property at the time of or prior to execution of this Contract. 
Sellers shall, at their expense and upon execution of the 
documents described in paragraph 3 above, furnish Buyer evidence 
of marketable title in the form of an Owner's Title Insurance 
Policy ("Title Policy") insuring Buyerfs interest in the Property 
under this Contract for the amount of the purchase price. The 
Title Policy issued to Buyer will contain the following numbered 
exceptions shown on the Ccwnmitment: ^ruercrQ Ltr J3' <JgTLr/6vV<?, 
9. Underlying Obligations. Except for 1988 taxes and 
assessments, Sellers warrant that there are no underlying 
obligations against the Property. 
10. Sellers' Covenant Against Liens. Except for the liens 
and encumbrances listed in Sections 8 and 9, Sellers covenant to 
keep the Property free and clear of all liens and encumbrances 
resulting from acts of Sellers. 
11. Buyer's Covenant Against Liens. Buyer covenants to 
keep the Property free and clear of all liens and encumbrances 
resulting from acts of Buyer during the term of this Contract, 
except for property which Buyer purchases under Section 4 herein. 
12. Survey. Sellers agree, at their expense, to provide 
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Buyer with a certified ALTA survey within forty-five (45) days 
after Buyer obtains from Sandy City the commercial zoning for the 
Property. 
13. Zoning. Sellers warrant and represent that they have 
received no claim nor notice of any building or zoning violation 
concerning the Property which has not been remedied prior to the 
execution of this Contract. 
14. Taxes and Assessments. Sellers agree to pay all taxes 
and assessments of every kind which become due on the Property 
during the life of this Contract. Sellers covenant that there 
are no taxes, assessments, or liens against the Property not 
mentioned in Section 8. Buyer agrees to pay all taxes and 
assessments upon and after execution of the documents described 
in paragraph 3 above. Buyer further agrees to reimburse Sellers 
for all taxes and assessment they pay from the Contract date to 
the execution of the documents described in paragraph 3 above. 
15. No Waste. Buyer agrees not to commit nor suffer to be 
committed any waste, spoil or destruction in or upon the Property 
which would impair Sellers' security. 
16. Commercial Zoning. Buyer, at its expense, shall apply 
for commercial zoning on the Property to build a commercial 
center thereon. However, should Buyer fail, with or without 
cause, to obtain such commercial zoning prior to March 3, 1989, 
then the Contract shall be void and the Down Payment refunded to 
Buyer. 
17. Sellers1 Option to Discharge Obligations. If Buyer 
defaults in the payment of taxes, assessments or other expenses 
of the Property, Sellers may, at Sellers' option, pay said taxes, 
assessments, insurance premiums or other expenses. If Sellers 
elect to do so, Buyer agrees to repay Sellers upon demand all 
such sums so advanced and paid by Sellers together with interest 
thereon from date of payment of said sums at the rate of ten 
percent (10%) per annum until paid. When the principal sum 
provided in this Contract is paid, if Buyer fails to also repay 
Sellers such advances, Sellers may refuse to convey title to the 
Property until such repayment is made. 
18. Buyers Default. Should Buyer fail to comply with any 
of the terms hereof, Sellers may, in addition to any other 
remedies afforded the Sellers in this Contract or by law, elect 
either of the following remedies: 
A. Sellers shall give Buyer written notice 
specifically stating: (1) the Buyer's default(s); (2) that Buyer 
shall have thirty (30) days from its receipt of such written 
notice within which to cure the default(s), which cure shall 
4 
include payment of Sellers' costs and reasonable attorney's fees; 
and (3) Sellers1 intent to elect this remedy if the Buyer does 
not cure the default(s) within thirty (30) days. Should Buyer 
fail to cure such default(s) within the thirty (30) days, then 
Sellers shall give to Buyer another written notice informing 
Buyer of his failure to cure the default(s) and of Sellers' 
election of this remedy. Immediately upon Buyer's receipt of 
this second written notice, Sellers shall be released from all 
obligations at law and equity to convey the Property to Buyer, 
and Buyer shall become at once a tenant-at-will of Sellers. All 
payments which have been made by Buyer prior thereto under this 
Contract shall, subject to then existing law and equity, be 
retained by Sellers as liquidated and agreed damages for breach 
of this Contract; or 
B. Sellers shall give Buyer written notice 
specifically stating: (1) The Buyer's default(s); (2) that Buyer 
shall have thirty (30) days from its receipt of such written 
notice within which to cure the default(s); and (3) Sellers' 
intent to elect this remedy if the Buyer does not cure the 
default(s) with the thirty (30) days. Should Buyer fail to cure 
such default(s) within the thirty (30) days, then Sellers shall 
give to Buyer another written notice informing Buyer of its 
failure to cure the default(s), Sellers1 election of this remedy, 
and that the entire unpaid balance hereunder is at once due and 
payable. Thereupon, Sellers may treat this Contract as a note 
and mortgage, pass or tender title to Buyer subject thereto, and 
proceed immediately with a mortgage foreclosure in accordance 
with the laws of the State of Utah. Upon filing the foreclosure 
complaint in court, Sellers shall be entitled to the immediate 
appointment of a receiver. The receiver may take possession of 
the Property, collect rents, issues and profits therefrom and 
apply them to the payment of the obligation hereunder, or hold 
them pursuant to the order of the court. Upon entry of a 
judgment of foreclosure, Sellers shall not be entitled to 
possession of the Property until the redemption period expires. 
19. Buyer's Remedies. In addition to any other remedy 
available to Buyer at law or in equity, Buyer may elect to 
rescind this Contract upon the occurrence of any of the 
following: 
A* Buyer's reasonable objection to the survey; 
B. Buyer's inability to obtain direct and immediate 
access, without unreasonable expense, to existing utilities for 
sewer, water, natural gas and electricity; 
C. Buyer's failure to obtain access to the Property 
from paved public roadways; 
D. Buyer's failure, with or without cause, to obtain 
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commercial zoning, acceptable to Buyer, for a commercial center 
on the Property; and 
E. Sellers breach of any covenant or term contained 
in this Contract• 
Upon rescission of the Contract, the Down Payment shall be 
returned to Buyer and Buyer shall have no further obligations 
under this Contract. 
20. Time of Essence. It is expressly agreed that time is 
of the essence in this Contract. 
21. Captions. Section captions shall not in any way limit 
modify, or alter the provisions in the Section. 
22. Notices. Except as otherwise provided herein, all 
notices required under this Contract will be effective when: (a) 
personally delivered; or (b) mailed certified or registered, 
addressed to the applicable party at the address shown in this 
contract, or at such other address as may be hereinafter 
designated by such party by written notice to the other party. 
23. Binding Effect. This Contract is binding on the heirs, 
personal representatives, successors and assigns of the 
respective parties hereto, 
24. Entire Agreement. This Contract contains the entire 
agreement between the parties hereto. Any provision hereof not 
enforceable under the laws of the State of Utah shall not affect 
the validity of any other provisions hereof. No supplement, 
modification or amendment of this Contract shall be binding on 
the parties hereto unless signed in writing by both parties 
hereto. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have duly executed this 
Contract the day and year first above written. 
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BUYER:/] S e l l e r s : 
COMMER I^AI*-^ NVESTMENT CORPORATION \ /'I r fl / j 
Don SiggarcJyOfrustee* 
Glenna F. S i g g a r c ^ / ^ r u s t e e * 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the *>l* day of ^JJAJJATT , 19 8&_ 
personally appeared before me Don goggard and Glenna F. Siggard, 
Trustees, signers of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged 
to me that they executed the same. 
Not^±y/#ublic 
Res 
1 /tJ&//s 
My commission expires: 
ding at s / ^ (//%£ 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the .3/^ day of ft/j^^fi , 19^£, personally 
appeared before me ^Z^ufi/// /y2 //Js/jkrzJ who being by me 
duly sworn, did say that he #s the ///£/ /sKZyunksff of 
Commercial Investment Corporation, a Utah corporation and that 
instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by authority 
of its bylaws (or of a resolution of its Board of Directors as 
the case may be), and said /^^^IOIJd ^/{ft/mri— acknowledge to me 
that said corporation executes; the^same. 
Residing at 4fUC, (dtii/* 
My conunission expires: 
•Trustee under the Don Siggard and Glenna F. Siggard Family 
Trust Agreement 
23:Busch.Cnt 7 
Exhibit "B" 
WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO: 
Busch Corporation 
5250 South 300 West, Suite 100 
Murray, Utah 84107 
WARRANTY DEED 
Don Siggard and Glenna F. Siggard, Trustees, grantors, Salt Lake 
City, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, hereby CONVEY and 
WARRANT to Commercial Investment Corporation, a Utah corporation 
of Murray, Utah, grantee, for the sum of Ten DOLLARS and other 
good and valuable consideration the following described tract of 
land in Salt Lake County, State of Utah: 
See legal description attached hereto 
and incorporated herein as Exhibit "A." 
DATED this day of , 19 . 
Don Siggard, Trustee* 
Glenna F. Siggard, Trustee* 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
On the day of , 19 , personally appeared 
before me Don Siggard, Trustee and Glenna F. Siggard, Trustee who 
being by me duly sworn, did duly acknowledge to me that they 
executed the same. 
Notary Public 
Residing at _ 
My commission expires: 
* Trustee under the Don Siggard and Glenna F. Siggard Family 
Trust Agreement 
Exhibit "C" 
When Recorded Mail To: 
Don and Glenna F. Siggard Trustees 
3318 Oakcliff Drive 
Holladay, Utah 84124 
TRUST DEED 
THIS TRUST DEED, made effective this 3rd day of March, 1988, 
between Commercial Investment Corporation, a Utah corporation, as 
TRUSTOR, whose address is 5250 South 300 West, Suite 100, Murray, 
Utah 84107, Landmark Title Company,TRUSTEE, and Don Siggard and 
Glenna F. Siggard, Trustees, BENEFICIARY. 
WITNESSETH: That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN 
TRUST, WITH POWER OF SALE, the following described property, 
situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah: 
See legal description attached hereto 
and incorporated herein as Exhibit "A." 
Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon 
and all water rights, rights of way, easements, rents, issues, 
profits, income, tenements, hereditament, privileges and 
appurtenances thereunto belonging now or hereafter used or 
enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof, SUBJECT, 
HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority hereinafter given to 
and conferred upon Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, 
issues, and profits; 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING. (1) payment of the 
indebtedness evidenced by a trust deed note of even date herewith 
and all sums due thereunder, in the face amount of $ , 
made by Trustor, payable to the order of Beneficiary at the times 
and in the manner therein set forth, and any extensions and/or 
renewals or modifications thereof; (2) the performance of each 
agreement of Trustor herein contained; (3) the payment of such 
additional loans or advances as hereafter may be made to Trustor, 
or its successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory note 
or notes reciting that they are secured by this Trust Deed; and 
(4) the payment of all sums expended or advanced by Beneficiary 
under or pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest 
thereon as herein provided. 
TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF THIS TRUST DEED: 
1. Trustor agrees to comply with all laws, covenants and 
restrictions affecting said property; not to commit or permit 
waste thereof; not commit, suffer or permit any act upon said 
property in violation of law; to do all other acts which from the 
character or use of said property may be reasonably necessary, 
the specific enumerations herein not excluding the general. 
2. Trustor agrees to appear in and defend any action or 
proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof, the title to 
said property, or the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; 
provided, however, that such action or proceeding shall arise 
from a person or entity claiming by, through, or under Trustor. 
3. Trustor agrees to pay before delinquent all taxes and 
assessments affecting said property, including all assessments ^  
upon water company stock and all rents, assessments, charges, andj\£5 
liens vith interest, on said property or any part thereof, which^ ' 
at any time appear to be prior or superior thereto.Trustor further agree. 
not to encumber the property, subject to this T. D. with any addit'l mort-
4. Trustor agrees should Trustor fail to make any payment >gage. 
or to do any act as herein provided, then Beneficiary or Trustee,^vj^x 
but without obligation so to do and without notice to or demand^ '" / 
upon Trustor and without releasing Trustor from any obligation /^ . I 
hereof, may: Make or do the same in such manner and to such/(f\l/* 
extent as either may deem necessary to protect the securityw/'^ 
hereof; Beneficiary or Trustee being authorized to enter upon v 
said property for such purposes; commence, appear in and defend 
any action or proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof 
or the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; pay, purchase, 
contest, or compromise any encumbrance, charge or lien which in 
the judgment of either appears to be prior or superior hereto. 
This paragraph 4, however, does not apply if the claim of a third 
party would constitute a breach of the covenants in the Warranty 
deed from Beneficiary to Trustor. 
5. Trustor agrees to pay immediately and without demand all 
sums expended hereunder by Beneficiary or Trustee, with simple 
interest from date of expenditure at the rate of ten percent 
(10%) per annum until paid, and the repayment thereof shall be 
secured hereby. 
6. Should said property or any part thereof be taken or 
damaged by reason of any public improvement or condemnation 
proceeding, or damaged by fire, or earthquake, or in any other 
manner, Beneficiary shall be entitled to all compensation, 
awards, and other payments or relief therefor, and shall be 
entitled as their option to commence, appear in and prosecute in 
their own name, any action or proceedings, or to make any compro-
mise or settlement, in connection with such taking or damage. 
All such compensation, awards, damages, rights of action and 
proceeds, including the proceeds of any policies of fire and 
other insurance affecting said property, are hereby assigned by 
Beneficiary, who shall apply the same on the indebtedness secured 
hereby or to restore or repair the property damaged or otherwise 
as directed by Trustor. 
7. At any time and from time to time upon written request 
of Beneficiary, and after payment of the Trustee's fees and 
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presentation of this Trust Deed and the Note, without affecting 
the liability of any person for the payment of the indebtedness 
secured hereby, Trustee may (a) consent to the making of any map 
or plat of said property; (b) join in granting any easement or 
creating any restriction thereon; (c) join in any subordination 
or other agreement affecting this Trust Deed or the lien or 
charge thereof; (d) reconvey, without warranty, all or any part 
of said property. The grantee in any reconveyance may be 
described as Mthe person or persons entitled thereto," and the 
recitals therein of any matters or facts shall be conclusive 
proof of the truthfulness thereof. Trustor agrees to pay 
reasonable Trustee's fees for any of the services mentioned in 
this paragraph. 
8. As additional security, Trustor hereby assigns to 
Beneficiary, during the continuance of these trusts, all rents, 
issues, royalties, and profits of the property affected by this 
Trust Deed. Unless Trustor executes a separate assignment to 
Beneficiary requiring that rents and profits be paid to 
Beneficiary, or until Trustor shall default in the payment of any 
indebtedness secured hereby or in the performance of any 
agreement hereunder, Trustor shall have the right to collect all 
such rents, issues, royalties, and profits earned prior to the 
default as they become due and payable. If Trustor shall default 
as aforesaid, Trustor's right to collect any of such moneys shall 
cease and Beneficiary shall have the right, with or without 
taking possession of the property affected hereto, to collect all 
rents, royalties, issues, and profits. Failure or discontinuance 
of Beneficiary at any time or from time to time to collect any 
such monies shall not in any manner affect the subsequent 
enforcement by Beneficiary of the right, power, and authority to 
collect the same. Nothing contained herein, nor the exercise of 
the right by Beneficiary to collect, shall be, or be construed, 
to be, an affirmation by Beneficiary of any tenancy, lease or 
option, nor an assumption of liability under, nor a subordination 
of the lien or charge of this Trust Deed to any such tenancy, 
lease or option. 
9. After Beneficiary has given Trustor written notice of 
any default by Trustor hereunder and Trustor fails to'cure such 
default within thirty (30) days after receipt of such notice, 
Beneficiary may, either in person, by agent, or by a receiver to 
be appointed by the court (Trustor hereby consenting to the 
appointment of a person designated by Beneficiary as such 
receiver), enter upon and take possession of said property or any 
part thereof, in their own name sue for or otherwise collect said 
rents, issues, and profits, including those past due and unpaid, 
and apply the same upon any indebtedness secured hereby and in 
such order as Beneficiary may determine. 
10. The entering upon and taking possession of said 
property, the collection of such rents, issues, and profits or 
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the proceeds of fire and other insurance policies, or 
compensation or awards for any taking or damage of said property, 
and the application or release thereof as aforesaid, shall not 
cure or waive any default or notice of default hereunder or 
invalidate any act done pursuant to such notice. 
11. The failure on the part of Beneficiary to promptly 
enforce any right hereunder shall not operate as a waiver of such 
right and the waiver by Beneficiary of any default shall not 
constitute a waiver of any other or subsequent default. 
12. Upon default by Trustor in the payment of any 
indebtedness secured hereby or in the performance of any 
agreement hereunder, Beneficiary shall give Trustor written 
notice specifically stating: (1) Trustors' default(s) (2) That 
Trustor shall have 30 days from its receipt of such written 
notice within which to cure the default(s); and (3) Beneficiary's 
intent to elect either to foreclosure judicially or non-
judicially if Trustor does not cure the default(s) within the 
thirty (30) days. Should Trustor fail to cure such default(s) 
within the thirty (30) days, then Beneficiary shall give to 
Trustor another written notice informing Trustor of its failure 
to cure the default(s) and, Beneficiary's election of their 
remedy to foreclose either judicially or non-judicially, and that 
the entire unpaid balance under the Note is at once due and 
payable. In the event of such default, Beneficiary may elect to 
foreclose this Trust Deed under Title 57, Chapter 1 of Utah Code 
Ann. (1953, as amended). Beneficiary may also elect to foreclose 
this Trust Deed in the manner provided by law for the foreclosure 
of mortgages on real property. 
13. Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time 
by filing for record in the office of the County Recorder of each 
county in which said property or some part thereof is situated, a 
substitution of trustee. From the time the substitution is filed 
for record, the new trustee shall succeed to all the powers, 
duties, authority and title of the trustee named herein or of any 
successor trustee. Each such substitution shall be executed and 
acknowledged, and notice thereof shall be given and proof thereof 
made, in the manner provided by law. 
14. This Trust Deed shall apply to, inure to the benefit 
of, and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees, devisees, 
personal representatives, successors, and assigns. All 
obligations of Trustor hereunder are joint and several. The term 
"Beneficiary" shall mean the owner and holder, including any 
pledgee, of the note secured hereby. In this Trust deed, when-
ever the context so requires, the masculine gender includes the 
feminine and/or neuter, and the singular number includes the 
plural. 
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15. Trustee accepts this Trust when this Trust Deed, duly 
executed and acknowledged, is made a public record as provided by 
law. Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto of 
pending sale under any other Trust deed or of any action or 
proceeding in which Trustor, Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be a 
party, unless brought by Trustee. 
16. This Trust Deed shall be construed according to the 
laws of the State of Utah. 
17. Trustor hereby requests that a copy of any notice of 
default and of any notice of sale hereunder be mailed to it at 
the address hereinbefore set forth. 
TRUSTOR: 
COMMERCIAL INVESTMENT CORPORATION 
By 
Its: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the day of , 19 , personally appeared 
before me, who being by me duly sworn, did say that he is the 
of Commercial Investment Corporation, a Utah 
corporation, and that said instrument was signed in behalf of 
said corporation in authority of its bylaws (or of a resolution 
of its board of directors, as the case may be), and said 
, acknowledged to me that said corporation 
executed the same. 
Notary Public 
Residing at _ 
My commission expires: 
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EXHIBIT "D" 
TRUST DEED NOTE 
$ Salt Lake City, Utah 
Effective March 3, 1988 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned promises to pay to the 
order of Don Siggard and Glenna F. Siggard, Trustees, at 3318 
Oakcliff Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah 84124, or at such other 
place as the holder hereof may designate, 
Dollars ($ ), together with 
interest from date at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum on 
the unpaid principal, said principal and interest payable as 
follows: 
Annual interest payments beginning March 3, 1989 
and continuing on the 3rd day of each succeeding March 
thereafter until March 3, 1998 at which time the entire 
unpaid principal shall be fully paid. 
Each payment shall be applied first to accrued interest and 
the balance to the reduction of principal. Holders agree to 
cause the Trustee under the Trust Deed to partially reconvey 
their Trust Deed on the Property upon principal payment under 
this Note of $35,000.00 per acre. Maker may make such request 
and designate which acreage is to be reconveyed at any such time 
as Maker makes any principal payments hereunder. 
This Note is secured by a Trust Deed of even date herewith. 
COMMERCIAL INVESTMENT CORPORATION, 
a Utah corporation 
By 
Its 
TabC 
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AMENDMENT 
Tnis Amendment is entered into this 30th day of March, 1989, by 
and between Don Siggard and Glenna F. Siggard, Trustees ( "Sel-
lers"), now located at 1480 East Mt. Manor Circle, Salt Lake 
.City, Utah 84121, and Commercial Investment Corporation ("Buy-
[etm) whose address is 5295 South 300 West, Suite 510, Murray, 
[otah 84107. 
[This Amendment shall modify that Real Estate Contract (herein-
'after referred to as •Contract") entered into between the parties 
[on August 31, 1988.* 
•jn consideration of the mutual promises contained herein and 
Mother good and valuable consideration the receipt and sufficiency 
[of which are hereby acknowledged: 
1. Seller agrees to sell and Buyer agrees to buy 16 acres 
within the tract of real property more fully described in 
the Contract. All other terms in Paragraph 1 of the Contract 
shall remain the same. 
2. Sellers acknowledge receipt of the $56,000 interest payment 
that was due and payable on March 3# 1989•. 
3. Paragraph 16 of the Contract is deleted* Buyers shall have 
no obligations to Sellers with regard to obtaining zoning 
for the real estate described in the Contract. 
4. Parties agree that the Contract is in full force and effect. 
5. All of the provisions in the Contract not modified herein 
shall continue in full force and effect. 
BUYER: 
COMMEFC 
SELLERS: 
INVESTMENT CORPORATION 
Glenna F. Siggard, Trustee* 
•Trustee under the Don Siggard and Glenna F. Siggard Family Trust 
Agreement 
EXHIBIT B [-* EXHIBIT 
5 /7 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the jy*_ day of^g^f/^ 
before m£^&$g*£^qqard and Glenna F, 
the Jp&^y itt&Zs&ent, who duly 
exec 
, 1989, personally appeared 
Siggard, Trustees, signers of 
acknowledged to me that they 
^ £u/> 
P u b l i c 
ing a t _ ^ ^ (/AXs 
COUNTY Or^S&TTLAKE ) 
On t h e 3 ^ day o f y ^ ^ 
{7s?*t«doJ /I ^USi<~f. who being 
he is /the ^£v fft*u/m7' 
before me 
did say that 
Investment Corporation, 
was signed in behalf of 
1989, personally appeared 
by me duly sworn, 
of Commercial 
a Utah corporation and that instrument 
said corporation by authority of its 
bylaws (or of a resolution of its Board of Directors as the case 
may be) and said /ZtottAJ£2&JASAT^ acknowledged to me 
that said corporate :ion executes the same. 
My coi 
«rJL/t 
N>ra*ry P u b l i c 
5 s i d i n g a t 
z f ^ tfAAs 
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P A Y E E D f T A C H THIS STATEMENT BEFORE DEPOSITING iuscH pRdf»cirfit*. INC. 
• A L T L A K l CITY, UTAH 
DATE 
3-30-89 
INVOICE NO D E S C R I P T I O N 
F i r s t annual Interest Payment on 16 Acres 
3 35,000 per acre 
AMOUNT 
56,000.00 
D I S C O U N T on 
OIOUCTION NET AMOUNT 
56,000.00 
TabF 
March 5, 1990 
Commercial Investment Corp. 
5295 So. 300 West 
Murray, Ut. 84107 
To whom it may concern, 
To comply with section Eighteen-A with the contract between 
Don Siggard and Glenna F. Siggard to commercial investment 
Corporation dated August 31, 1989, we submit this notice of 
buyers default in annual option payment of Fifty Six Thousand 
^Dollars ($56,000.00) as of March 3, 1990. Buyer has thirty 
days from receipt of this notice to cure the default. 
Don Siggard 
3165 Fur Hollow Dr. 
Sandy, Utah 84093 
Please note address change 
k EXHIBIT 
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ETC 
S t M W UCOO 
P ^m i^ 531 353 
RECEIPT F«MLCERT1F1ED MAIL 
NO iNSUNtfKC COVWAtf WOVI0C0 
NOT R3IINTENIATIONAI. MAIL 
1 Syftfi^^^^i^H^-^y 
Streat and No ^
 A £ 
PO State and ZlFVCoda ^ _ 
t a g * ^ Postage 
Certified Fee 
Sptoai OeHvecy Fee 
3 
Restricted Oefcvery Fee 
Return Receiot snowing 
to ***** and Oata Oa*vacad 
Return Racatot snowing to wnom 
Oata and Addrass o^jOffc/eJ^ . 
Isz. 
&z-
TabG 
Commercial Investment Corp, 
5295 So- 3rd West 
Murray, Utah 84107 
April 3, 1990 
Commercial Investment Corp., 
In compliance to section 18-A of the contract with Don & Cenna 
Siggard and the Commercial Investment Corp. dated Augur 31, 
1988, we submit this second letter of buyers default in 
compliance to the agreement in the contract. Since, the default 
notified in the first letter mailed March 5, 1990 was not cured, 
rt "• ipt of this letter releases seller of all obligations to 
the original contract with Commercial Investment Corp. dated 
August 31, 1988. 
CC: DS/ks 
*3f~**r 
><30u.iJi+: •-* 
-£*7 
•ftr~r 
K : . ^ 
W J ^ ^ J !"*Wftr fe 
P SHI Iflt, TT7 
RECEIPT FOR CERTIFIED MAIL 
NO IMSUIIMICt COVttAtt PWVTOO 
MOT MM MTONATOIIM. MAIL 
S**io 
SlrwiandNo 
PO.St*«andZIPCoi* *j{/0l \ 
C**m*f— 
Sptoal 0*w«ry f— 
I Restricted 0€*v€<y P«* 
5
^ 
**r 
R«<Mm R«c«pt snoyng 
to "*om and OlM 0*»v* 90 
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CORBRLDGE. BAIRD Si CHRISTENSEN 
LAWRENCE E. CORBRIDGE 
JOHN KNAFP BAXRD 
JAMES L CHRISTENSEN 
RICHARD C TERRY 
PAUL D. NEWTON 
MARK J MORRISK 
MICHAEL LEE 
TAMAR a JERGENSEN 
A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W 
2 1 5 SOUTH STATE 
S U I T E 8 0 0 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
A p r i l 4 , 1990 
TELEPHONE 
<801» 534-09O9 
TELECOPIER 
<801> 5 3 4 - 1 9 4 8 
Via Mail, Certified Mail, Hand-Delivery 
Mr. Don Siggard and Glenna F. Siggard, Trustees 
3165 Fur Hollow Drive 
Sandy, UT 84093 
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Siggard: 
I have been retained by Commercial Investment Corporation to 
respond to your letters dated March 5, 1990, and April 3, 1990. 
In reviewing your notices and Commercial Investment Corporation's 
file I note the following deficiencies: 
1. The Amendment executed by Commercial Investment 
Corporation on March 30, 1989, has not been executed by Glenna F. 
Siggard, trustee; 
2. Don Siggard and Glenna F. Siggard, trustees under the 
Don and Glenna F. Siggard Family Trust Agreement have not sent 
any notices required under paragraph 18 of the Real Estate 
Contract; 
3. The April 3, 1990, notice was sent two days premature. 
For the above stated reasons, both the March 5, 1990 letter 
and the April 3, 1990 letter are deficient. You are hereby put 
on notice that Commercial Investment Corporation will not 
recognize any notices in connection with the Real Estate Contract 
executed on August 31, 1988, unless they are executed by both Don 
Siggard and Glenna F. Siggard, trustees. Moreover, Commercial 
Investment Corporation hereby requests the return of the 
Amendment dated March 30, 1989, with the original signatures of 
both Don Siggard, trustee, and Glenna F. Siggard, trustee. 
As you know, Commercial Investment Corporation has obtained 
commercial zoning and site plan approval from Sandy City. 
Pursuant to paragraph 12 of the Real Estate Contract, you were 
required to obtain and provide Commercial Investment Corporation 
with a certified ALTA survey which you have failed to do. You 
are hereby put on notice of your breach under paragraph 12 of the 
Real Estate Contract and requested to deliver the ALTA survey 
immediately, 
T- EXHIBIT 
3 
Don and Glenna Siggard 
April 5, 1990 
Page 2 
This letter shall serve as the written notice required under 
paragraph 3 of the Real Estate Contract that Commercial 
Investment Corporation will be ready to select a mutually 
convenient date for the execution and delivery of the Warranty 
Deed, Trust Deed and Note after receiving the survey. 
Commercial Investment Corporation also requests evidence of 
full payment of all taxes and assessments against the property as 
required under paragraph 14 of the Real Estate Contract prior to 
the exchange of the Warranty Deed, Trust Deed and Note. 
Thank you for your attention in this matter. I expect 
prompt response with regard to delivery of the executed Amendment 
ALTA survey, and proof of payment of taxes. 
Sincerely, 
CORBRIDGE BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
JLC/amj 
Tab I 
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WHEN RECORDED PLEASE MAIL TOt 
mercial Investment Corp. 
/0 Busch Corporation 
obert 8usch 
295 South 320 West if510 
LC, Utah 84107 
NOTICE OF INTEREST ^ M^A \^ 
<# 
KNOW ALL MEN 8Y THESE PRESENTS: 
The undersigned hereby give notice of an interest claimed with 
respect to certain real property located in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, particularly described as follows, to-wit: 
The Northwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of Section 20, Township 3, 
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
EXCEPTING TliERETROM the following* BEGINNING North 0° 07'30" West 
1327.82 feet from the South quarter corner of Section 20; and r-ming 
thence North 0°07'30" West 100.84 feet; thence North 09°52'30" East 
456 feet; thene South 0° 07'3O" East 183.58 feet more or les3; thence 
North 89°46,5i" West 456 feet moro or less to the point of 3ECINNING. 
m. 
Rrcjtuat of LANDMARK TITLE COMPANY 
KATIE L DIXON, rtocoraor 
Silt Lako County, Utah 
*-2£
 Entry NO. Jif&1053 
COURTESY RECORDING 
Thla document la being racordad aoitfy as i 
courtesy and an accomodation to trie partita 
named therein. LAN0MARK TITLE COMPANY 
hereby expressly diactaima any rasponaibillty 
or liability for the accuracy or the content 
thereof. 
DATEDi April 4, 1990 COMME^C^>jg^r^gi^T>g08PQRATIOW 
^- Robert R. Buach. President 
STATB OF UTAH 
COUNTY OP SALT LAKE 
) 
) SS. 
) 
4th dey of AP?U 19 90 On the 
appeared before me 
R^h^ri- ft ffmrh, pr»« i r i«n t rtf r^mm^rM »1 Tnv«« t»m«nt» rftrpnrwMftn 
the sxgner(s) of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged 
to me that 
fotary Public 
ho executed the same. 
NO' 
Residing att SLC, Utah 
My Commission Expiresi 07/90 
«<HEN RECORDED PLEASE H A I L m i 
tr\n\«rcial lnvfi»m«nt Corp. 
C/O Hutch Corporation 
ftobart Butch 
W 9 5 South J2U Waat 1510 
t.C, Utah 84107 
NOTICE Of INTEREST 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE HRESENTSi 
Tha undaralgnad haraby gtv* notlca of 9t\ Intaraat clalmad with 
n ratpact to cartain raal proparty locatad in Salt Laka County, 
Irt Stata of Utah, particularly daicribad aa follova, to-wtti 
fH 
2 Tha N o r t h v a a t Q u a r t a r o f t h a S o u t h a a t t Q u a r t a r o f S a c t i o n 2 0 , T o w n t h i p 3 , 
^ S o u t h , Ranga 1 E a a t , S a l t Laka Baaa and M a r i d l a n . 
EXCEPTINC THEREFROH t h a f o l l o w i n g ! BEGINNING N o r t h 0 ° 0 7 ' 3 0 ' Waat 
1 3 2 7 . 8 2 f a a t from tha S o u t h q u a r t a r c o r n a r o f S a c t i o n 2 0 ; and r u n n i n g 
t h a n c a N o r t h 0 ° 0 7 ' 3 0 - Haat 1 8 0 . 8 4 f r t i t h a n c a N o r t h 8 9 ° 5 2 ' 3 0 - Eaa t 
456 f a a t i t h a n a S o u t h 0 ° 0 7 ' 3 0 * Eaat 1 3 . 5 8 f a a t awra o r l a t a / t h a n c a 
N o r t h 8 9 ° 4 6 ' 5 1 * Waat 456 f a a t mora o r l a t a t o t h a p o i n t o f BEGINNING. 
COMT.T'YnSCO^OfNQ 
Th!adc:imv|{ ..
 f adoolalyaaa 
oouriav* . .* i -> ,ix ^v-tiaa 
nti^rt Ih* .f» lAi'QV,;,
 % in^'.CC "WW 
haruby a. ytrtj o-a- Jr. i v,y roj;,>Mifcll»ty 
or ffaftiUty for uw accuracy or tha conto.it 
fearacf. 
DATED< A p r i l 4 . 1 » » 0 COMMT T ^ O y p RATION 
^ K o b a r t W. Butch. Praaldant 
STATE or in AH ) 
) • • • 
COUNTY Of SALT LAKI ) 
O* *»• ^ 8 th day of 
appaarad bafora m* __ 
April l« fO . paraonally 
. f0t)ir# ^ *Va#,1'
 Ll*+%iA*«* ,«' e * T M a l Tfivg«»yr,» Cnrn^rmtinn 
y»r?a"'Il«ar( a) of tha foragoing inatr\mant, who duly ackhowladgad 
/ ^ i f l W t ha •Ktcutad tha tama. . 
tUMtiUmi KIT i KNTT 
i t i 8LC, Utah 
ftaion txp l ras t 07 / *0 ON 
£7C/¥/CtZO 
**4 
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MICHAEL I. ALDRICH & ASSOCIATES 
Consulting Engineers 
2144 South Highland Dr. 
Suite 170 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
(801)487-6563 
DCG - 0 1003 
DEC - 9 1993 
December 7, 199 3 
Mr. Randy Coke 
Nigarrd, Coke and Vincent 
3 33 North 3 00 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Dear Randy, 
I am writing this letter to you to inform you that Mr. Don 
Siggard contacted me 3 or 4 years ago to survey a parcel of 
property, he owned near the Indian Hill Subdivision, in Sandy. 
Don called and asked me to schedule some time during the 
following week to survey this parcel for him. He said he would 
get back to me with all the data I would need for the survey, and 
with the date the survey should be completed. The survey was 
never completed, because when Don never did get back to me with 
any information or a date. 
If I can be of further information, please call me. 
ENGINEERS, LANDSCAPE ARCHITECTS, SURVEYORS, PLANNERS 
TabK 
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Randall N. Skanchy (USB #2968) 
Scott D. Cheney (USB #6198) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Defendants 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Post Office Box 45444 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
James L. Christensen, (USB #0639) 
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 534-0909 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
COMMERCIAL INVESTMENT 
CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DON SIGGARD AND GLENNA F. 
SIGGARD, as Trustees for the Don Siggard 
and Glenna F. Siggard Family Trust, 
Defendants. 
PRETRIAL ORDER 
Case No. 920904431CV 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
121647 3 
f\ 
0 0 0 2 4 
This matter came before the Court on July 17, 1995, at a Pre-Trial Conference 
held pursuant to Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure before the Honorable 
Glenn K. Iwasaki, Third District Court Judge. Randall N. Skanchy and Scott D. Cheney of 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough appeared as counsel for the Defendants, Don and 
Glenna F. Siggard Family Trust, Don and Glenna F. Siggard Trustees (the "Siggards"). 
James L. Christensen of Corbridge, Baird and Christensen, appeared as counsel for Plaintiff, 
Commercial Investment Corporation ("CIC"). The following action was taken: 
1. JURISDICTION. This is an action for specific performance of a real estate 
contract for the sale of real property located in Salt Lake County, Utah, with the Siggards 
asserting counterclaims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, wrongful lien, breach of 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and for intentional interference with 
prospective economic relations. Jurisdiction of the Court is thus invoked under Utah Code 
Ann. Section 78-3-4 and is not disputed. The Court determined its jurisdiction to be present. 
2. VENUE. Venue is laid by CIC in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
Section 78-13-1. The Court determined such venue to be proper. 
3. GENERAL NATURE OF THE PARTIES' CLAIMS. 
(1) Commercial Investment Corporation's Claims: 
a. Breach of Contract. CIC has sued for breach of the Real E i^ate 
Contract, claiming the following breaches: Siggard declared the 
contract in default, having already breached the contract first and 
121647 3 2 
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without complying with the notice requirements of the contract; Siggard 
failed to timely provide an ALTA survey; Siggard refused to allow 
plaintiff to designate its desired acreage; and Siggard refused to honor 
the terms of the contract. CIC pleaded both rescission and specific 
performance as potential remedies for the alleged breach. 
b. Specific Performance. CIC pleaded as a separate cause of action 
Specific Performance of the contract based on the alleged breaches of 
contract by the defendants. CIC elected Specific Performance as its 
chosen remedy by motion to the court dated January 25, 1995. 
c. Relinquished Claims. 
(i) Unjust Enrichment. CIC alleged in count two of the First Amended 
Complaint that the Siggards were unjustly enriched by CIC's 
development efforts on the property including engineering, planning and 
the obtaining of commercial zoning for a portion of the property. CIC 
also alleged the Siggards were unjustly enriched by retaining their 
property without paying CIC adequate compensation. This claim was 
relinquished by CIC in its election of specific performance as its remedy 
in its motion and memorandum dated January 25, 1995. 
(ii) Rescission. CIC claimed it was entitled under the contract to 
rescind the contract and receive all payments made by CIC to Siggards 
121647 3 3 
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in the event of breach of the contract by the Siggards. This claim is 
also relinquished by CIC's election of specific performance as its 
remedy dated January 25, 1995. 
Siggards' Defenses: 
a. Breach of Contract 
(i) The Real Estate Contract is voidable for lack of consideration 
and is unconscionable. 
(ii) CIC breached the contract by failing to make the down payment, 
by failing to make annual interest payments under its terms, by failing to 
designate property to be surveyed, thereby rendering performance by 
Siggards impossible, and by placing a Notice of Interest on the 
Siggards' property. 
(iii) CIC's claim for specific performance fails because of CIC's 
failure to make a sufficient tender. 
(iv) CIC's claims are barred by the doctrine of unclean hands. 
(v) CIC failed to mitigate its alleged damages. 
(vi) CIC's claims are barred by waiver and estoppel in that CIC 
waived its right to claim a lack of a survey for its failure to designate 
the property to be surveyed. 
4 
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b. Unjust Enrichment 
(i) This claim is negated by virtue of CIC's election of specific 
performance of the contract as its chosen remedy. 
(ii) Siggards have not been enriched due to any act of CIC. 
c. Specific Performance 
(i) CIC has not tendered specific performance and is unable to 
tender specific performance. 
(ii) CIC has unclean hands. 
(iii) CIC breached the contract by failing to make the down payment, 
by failing to make annual interest payments under its terms, by 
failing to designate the property to be surveyed, thereby 
rendering performance by Siggards impossible, and by placing a 
Notice of Interest on the Siggards' property. 
d. Rescission 
(i) CIC's election of specific performance as its remedy negates this 
claim. 
(ii) CIC breached the contract by failing to make the down payment, 
by failing to make annual interest payments under its terms, by failing to 
designate the property to be surveyed, thereby rendering performance by 
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Siggards impossible, and by placing a Notice of Interest on the 
Siggards' property. 
Siggards' Counterclaims: 
a. Breach of Express Contract. CIC breached the express terms of the 
Real Estate Contract by failing to make required annual interest 
payments, failing to make the initial down payment, by failing to 
designate the property to be surveyed and encumbering the real property 
by filing a Notice of Interest on the subject property. 
b. Uniust Enrichment. CIC would be unjustly enriched if it received 
the property without making the down payment, without making the 
required interest payments and by encumbering all of the Siggards' 
property, despite having claim to only a portion of the subject property. 
CIC would also be unjustly enriched if it is allowed to receive the 
benefit of several years of unprecedented increase in the value of the 
land without making some reasonable compensation for such increase in 
the value of the land. 
c. Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. CIC's 
failure to perform the contract, its refusal to designate the property to be 
surveyed and its very entering into the Real Estate Contract without the 
ability to perform the contract was in bad faith and constitutes a breach 
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of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in the Real Estate 
Contract. 
d. Wrongful Lien. CICs filing of a Notice of Interest encumbering the 
entire thirty-eight (38) acres of the Siggards' property while having a 
claim to only sixteen acres constitutes a wrongful lien on the Siggards' 
property. 
e. Interference with Prospective Economic Relations. CIC filed the 
Notice of Interest with the improper purpose, causing interference in the 
Siggards' prospective economic relations regarding the property. 
4. UNCONTROVERTED FACTS. The following facts are established by 
admissions in the pleadings or by stipulation of counsel: 
a. CIC is a Utah corporation with its principal place of business in Salt 
Lake County, Utah. 
b. The Defendants Don and Glenna F. Siggard are trustees of the Don and 
Glenna F. Siggard Family Trust, a beneficial trust created under the laws of Utah. 
c. At all times relevant to this action, Robert Busch was president of CIC. 
d. On August 31, 1989, the parties entered into a real estate contract (the 
"contract") for the sale and purchase of twenty (20) acres of a thirty-eight (38) acre parcel 
located in Sandy, Utah, owned by the Siggard Family Trust. 
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e. The contract required and acknowledged the deposit of a down payment 
by CIC to Landmark Title Company, although the actual payment of the down payment is 
disputed. 
f. The contract also required, among other things, that CIC make annual 
interest payments of ten percent (10%) per annum on the balance due to the'Siggards on 
March 3 of each year until 1998, in the event the contract was not rescinded. 
g. The first annual interest payment was due March 3, 1989, unless the 
contract was rescinded. 
h. The Siggards did not receive the first annual interest payment on or 
before March 3, 1989. 
i. On March 5, 1989, the Siggards sent notice of default to CIC requiring 
CIC to make the payment within 30 days, and CIC received the notice. 
j . CIC paid the first annual interest payment of $56,000.00 on March 30, 
1989, within the required 30 days, after receiving notice of default. 
k. On March 30, 1989, the parties entered an Amendment to the Real 
Estate Contract, changing, among other things, the acreage to be sold and purchased from 
twenty (20) to sixteen (16) acres. 
1. On August 22, 1989, the Sandy City Commission entered Ordinance 
89-33 rezoning 10 acres of the Siggards' property to Special District Neighborhood 
Commercial (SD CN). 
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m. The Siggards did not obtain nor deliver a survey to CIC within 45 days 
of August 22, 1989, but did obtain and deliver a survey of the entire 38 acre parcel of 
property to CIC in June 1994. 
n. CIC did not pay, nor did the Siggards receive the annual interest 
payment that was due on March 3, 1990. 
o. On March 5, 1990, the Siggards mailed a notice of default of the 
contract to CIC; CIC received this notice on March 6, 1990. 
p. CIC did not make the annual interest payment. 
q. On April 3, 1990, the Siggards again notified CIC of its alleged default 
and its failure to cure, and declared themselves released of the obligations under the contract; 
CIC received this notice on April 3, 1990. 
r. On April 4, 1990, CIC filed a Notice of Interest claiming an interest in 
all thirty-eight (38) acres of the Siggards' property. 
s. On April 4, 1990, CIC sent a letter to the Siggards claiming default by 
the Siggards and demanding delivery of an ATLA survey and requiring proof of payment of 
taxes. 
t. CIC did not have, in 1990, nor has it ever had, a bank account in its 
name. 
5. CONTESTED ISSUES OF FACT. Contested issues of fact remaining for 
decision are: 
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a. Except as designated as uncontested above, all factual matters relevant 
to the questions of law or fact listed below. 
b. Who drafted the contract. 
c. Whether plaintiff made ths down payment, and whether such payment 
was deposited with Landmark Title. 
d. Whether plaintiff was ready, willing and able to perform the contract in 
1990, and today. 
e. Whether and when Siggards received notice of the rezoning of 10 acres. 
f. Whether the Siggards refused to allow CIC to designate the acres it 
would buy and otherwise refused to comply with the terms of the contract prior to March 3, 
1990. 
g. Whether Siggard complied with the forfeiture and notice provisions of 
the contract. 
h. Whether plaintiff has incurred any damages. 
i. Whether CIC ever tendered its full performance of the contract. 
j . Whether CIC had, in 1990, or at any other time, any assets other than 
the Real Estate Contract. 
k. Whether CIC ever designated the property to be surveyed. 
6. CONTESTED ISSUES OF LAW. The contested issues of law, in addition to 
those implicit in the foregoing issues of fact, are: 
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a. Whether the contract is enforceable. 
b. Whether Siggards breached the contract, and when. 
c. Whether encumbering all 38 acres of Siggards' property constitutes a 
wrongful lien. 
d. Whether CIC breached the contract. 
e. Whether CIC is entitled to specific performance, and if so, whether CIC 
owes any interest to date and whether the contract performance dates should be extended. 
f. Whether CIC breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
g. Whether CIC tendered its full performance under the contract and 
whether CIC is excused from that tender. 
h. The measure of Siggards' damages, if any. 
i. Whether Siggard was required to comply with the forfeiture and notice 
provisions of the contract. 
j . Whether plaintiff intentionally interfered with Siggards' prospective 
economic relations. 
k. Whether CIC has the duty to mitigate when it is not seeking damages. 
1. Whether Siggards are entitled to attorneys' fees as a measure of their 
damages as a result of CIC's alleged breach of the contract and of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing or under any other statutory or legal basis. 
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7. EXHIBITS. The following documents are expected trial exhibits of the 
parties: 
a. The parties have agreed and stipulated to the admission of the exhibits 
as listed in the attached Trial Exhibit list. 
b. Plaintiffs' proposed trial exhibits are listed in Appendix ;,A" attached 
hereto and incorporated herein. 
c. Defendant's proposed trial exhibits are listed in Appendix "B" attached 
hereto and incorporated herein. 
d. The parties will file a stipulation as to which exhibits may be admitted 
into evidence within seven (7) days of trial. 
e. The parties shall exchange copies of their proposed trial exhibits within 
seven (7) days of trial. 
f. If other exhibits are to be offered and their necessity can be reasonably 
anticipated, they will be designated in a writing filed with the Court and submitted to 
opposing counsel at least three (3) days prior to trial. 
8. WITNESSES. Except with respect to rebuttal witnesses, if any: 
a. In the absence of reasonable notice to opposing counsel to the contrary, 
CIC will call the following persons as witnesses: Bob Busch, Andrew Walton, Bailey 
Butters, the Siggards, Gary Free, Ken Dyer, Mike Coulam, George Shaw, and Gil Avillar. 
CIC may call Greg Hales, Barbara Busch, and an engineer or surveyor. 
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CIC may use the depositions of Don Siggard, Bob Busch, Andy Walton, Mike 
Coulam, George Shaw, and Gil Avillar. 
b. In the absence of reasonable notice to opposing counsel to the contrary, 
defendants, the Siggards, will call the following persons as witnesses: Don and Glenna 
Siggard, Jeff Jensen, David Van Drimmelen, Michael Aldrich and Richard Sorensen. 
Defendants may call the following persons as witnesses: Mike Coulam, Mike Holmes and 
Gil Avillar. 
Defendants may use the depositions of Don Siggard, Andrew Walton, Robert 
Busch, Mike Coulam, George Shaw, and Gil Avillar. 
c. In the event other witnesses are to be called at trial, a statement of their 
names and addresses and the general subject matter of their testimony will be served upon 
opposing counsel at least seven (7) days prior to trial. This restriction shall not apply to 
rebuttal witnesses, the necessity of whose testimony reasonably cannot be anticipated before 
the time of trial. 
9. MATTERS TO BE RESOLVED. Prior to commencement of trial briefing, 
the following matters remain to be resolved by the court: 
a. Appraisals — to be exchanged by July 21, 1995. 
b. Motions in Limine — to be argued on August 1, 1995, at 9:00 a.m. 
10. REQUEST FOR INSTRUCTIONS, Requests for voir dire examination of 
the jury and request for instructions to the jury shall be exchanged and submitted to the 
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Court by August 2, 1995. Counsel may supplement requested instructions during trial on 
matters that were not reasonably anticipated prior to trial. Proposed written questions for 
submission to the jury for the return of a special verdict, pursuant to Rule 49 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, shall be submitted to the Court at the same time as the request for 
instructions to the jury. 
11. AMENDMENTS TO THE PLEADINGS. The Court allowed CIC to amend 
the Complaint to add a claim for specific performance. CIC submitted its First Amended 
Complaint on July 30, 1993. 
12. DISCOVERY. Discovery has been completed except for the interviewing or 
deposition of witnesses which must be completed by July 27, 1905. 
13. TRIAL SETTING. The case was set for a three-day jury trial to commence 
on August 1, 1995, at 9:00 o'clock a.m. at Room 301, 240 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah. 
14. POSSIBILITY OF SETTLEMENT. The possibility of settlement is 
considered fair. 
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DATED this V 
<r 
day of July, 1995. 
BY THE CO 
The Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Third Judicial District Court Judge 
Prior to execution by the Court, the foregoing Pretrial Order is hereby adopted this 
day of July, 1995. 
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
c. C&-IT 
es L. Christensen 
irneys for Plaintiff 
Commercial Investment Corporation 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & 
MCDONOUGH 
Sieaiichy •> 
Scott D. Cheney 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Don and Glenna F. Siggard 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the * i | ^ day of July, 1995, I caused to be hand delivered, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing PRETRIAL ORDER to: 
James L. Christensen 
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 „ 
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TRIAL EXHIBIT INDEX 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement, March 3, 1988. 
Promissory Note, March 3, 1988. 
Site Plan (Exhibit A), April 19, 1988. 
Letter to Allen McCandless from Bailey Butters, April 20, 1988 with 
accompanying letter of April 20, 1988, property plat, legal description. 
Commitment for Title Insurance, June 7, 1988. 
Amended Commitment for Title Insurance, August 31, 1988. 
Real Estate Contract, August 31, 1988. 
Site Plan, November 8, 1988. 
Letter to Allen McCandless from Bailey Butters, dated November 22, 1988. 
Memo from Planning Department to Planning Commission and City Council, dated 
November 23, 1988. 
Sandy City Zone change documents (See Appendix A-1, 57 separate documents). 
February 1989 Busch Comments with Regard to Stipulations from Crescent Village 
Citizens Committee. 
Sandy City Zoning Ordinance #89-2, #89-33, January 10, 1989. 
Sandy City Zoning Ordinance #89-33. 
§ 15-29-27, Sandy City Development Code. 
Notice of Buyer's Default, March 6, 1989. 
Amendment to Real Estate Contract, March 30, 1989. 
$56,000 check stub of Busch Properties, Inc. dated March 30, 1989. 
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Memo from Phil Glenn to Councilmen, Andy Walton and others, dated June 15, 
1989. 
Notice of Buyers Default, March 5, 1990 and certified mail return receipts. 
Notice of Forfeiture of Buyers, April 3, 1990 and certified mail return receipts. 
Notice of Interest, April 4, 1990. 
Letter to Siggards from Christensen, April 4, 1990. 
Handwritten note of Don Siggard, April 22, 1992. 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement from Woodside Homes, Inc., September 14, 
1992. 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement from Perry & Associates, Inc., December 10, 
1992. 
December 7, 1993 Letter from Michael L. Aldrich to Randy Coke. 
Sorensen ALTA Property Survey, June, 1994. 
Drawings of legal descriptions for zoned property: April 20, 1988, November 8, 
1988, Ordinance 89-33, Site Plan 1994. 
CIC Appraisals. 
Siggard Appraisal. 
Site Plan Review Chapter 15-22 Site Plan Review. 
Time Line of Events. 
Property Tax Evaluations for 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995. 
Planning Commission Application dated September 20, 1994. 
Sandy City Site Plan Review Procedures and Standards. 
Site Plans, September 13, 1994. 
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APPENDIX A 
PLAINTIFFS ADDITIONAL EXHIBITS 
CIC Timeline. 
Aerial Photograph of Property. 
Cash Receipts #310916 and 310917 dated September 20, 1994. 
Subdivision or Site Plan Review Fees Form, September 14, 1994. 
Application for Conditional Use Permit, September 20, 1994. 
Update Market Analysis for Retail/Commercial Development - 11300 South 1000 
East for Gardner and Associates by Leffler & Associates, September, 1994. 
Letter to Sandy City Planning Commission from Bill Peperone, September 20, 
1994. 
Legal Description. 
Letter to Sandy City Planning Department from Commercial Investment Corp., 
September 29, 1994. 
Letter to Sandy City from Commercial Investment Corp., October 3, 1994. 
Memorandum to Greg Hales from Bill Peperone, October 3, 1994. 
Memorandum of Kathy Jeffery, Deputy City Attorney from Bill Peperone, 
October 25, 1994. 
Sandy City Meeting Minutes, October 25, 1994. 
Commitment for Title Insurance, January 30, 1995. 
Certificate of Deposit for $56,000 in the name of Commercial Investment 
Corporation. 
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APPENDIX B 
DEFENDANTS' ADDITIONAL EXHIBITS 
1. September 8, 1992 letter from Randy Coke to Jim Christensen. 
2. September 14, 1994 letter to Jim Christensen from Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & 
McDonough. 
121647 3 
TabL 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—71ZZ zxm 
COMMERCIAL INVESTMENT CORP. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DON SIGGARD AND GLENNA F. 
SIGGARD, as Trustees for the Don Siggard 
and Glenna F. Siggard Family Trust, 
Defendants. 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
Case No. 920904431CV 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
Please answer the following questions based on your determination of whether the fact 
in question has been established by a preponderance of the evidence. If you find that the 
evidence supports a given fact by a preponderance you should answer the questions as to that 
fact "Yes." If, on the other hand, if you find that the evidence as to a given fact is so equally 
balanced that you cannot determine the preponderance of the evidence, or if you find that the 
evidence preponderates against the fact presented, answer the question as to that fact "No." 
Some questions have already been marked for you based upon the stipulation of the parties. 
1. Was the contract between Commercial Investment Corporation and the Siggards 
a valid contract? 
X Yes No 
133425 1 
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2. Did Commercial Investment Corporation fail to fully tender its performance 
and perform all of its contractual obligations according to the terms of the Contract including 
the timely payment of all amounts due? 
X Yes No 
3. Was Commercial Investment Corporation excused from tendering its 
performance and from performing its contractual obligations including its annual interest 
payment obligations? 
Yes X No , - \ 
4. Is Commercial Investment Corporation/precluded^ from asserting that it is 
excused from failing to perform its obligations by any one of the following: a) estoppel,b ) 
waiver, and/or c) unclean hands? 
5. Is Commercial Investment Corporation entitled to specific performance of the 
Real Estate Contract? 
Yes \ No 
6. Did the Siggards perform all steps necessary to forfeit Commercial Investment 
Corporation's interest in the contract? 
JL Yes No 
7. Was the Notice of Interest filed by Commercial Investment Corporation in 
violation of Utah Wrongful Lien Statute? 
_X Yes No 
8. Did Commercial Investment Corporation breach the Real Estate Contract? 
\ Yes No 
133425 1 
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9. Considering only the evidence concerning damages, and without being 
concerned with the fault of any party in answering this question, what amount of money would 
fairly and adequately compensate the Siggards for actual damages suffered by them proximately 
caused by the filing of the Notice of Interest? 
Amount: $ -f~h 
The foregoing answers agreed upon, signed and returned to the Court this ^f^ day 
of August, 1995. 
(^^J^TC^J ^T^UIAJ 
i^ Qj^ person 
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Randall N. Skanchy (USB #2968) 
Scott D. Cheney (USB #6198) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendants and Counterclaim 
Plaintiffs Don and Glenna F. Siggard 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
COMMERCIAL INVESTMENT CORP. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DON SIGGARD AND GLENNA F. 
SIGGARD, as Trustees for the Don Siggard 
and Glenna F. Siggard Family Trust, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT r^. CT6 "C^ 
Case No. 920904431CV 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Pursuant to Rule 58A(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this Judgment is hereby 
entered upon the verdict of the jury, the trial of this matter having come before the Court on 
Tuesday, August 1, 1995, for jury trial, the jury being duly constituted and the trial proceeding 
August 1, 2, 3 and 4, plaintiff and counterclaim defendant Commercial Investment Corporation 
having been represented by James L. Christensen and Mark J. Morrise of the law firm 
Corbridge, Baird & Christensen, and defendants and counterclaim plaintiffs Don Siggard and 
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Glenna F. Siggard, as Trustees for the Don Siggard and Glenna F. Siggard Family Trust 
("Siggards"), having been represented by Randall N. Skanchy and Scott D. Cheney of the law 
firm of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough. The jury, having carefully considered the 
evidence, the testimony of the witnesses, argument by counsel and having received the exhibits, 
jury instructions, and the special verdict, and the Court having received the jury's completed 
special verdict which found as follows: 
(i) The contract between Commercial Investment Corporation and the 
Siggards was a valid contract. (This finding was stipulated to by the parties prior to 
submission to the jury); and 
(ii) Commercial Investment Corporation failed to fully tender its 
performance and perform all of its contractual obligations according to the terms of 
the Contract including the timely payments of all amounts due (this finding was 
stipulated to by the parties prior to submission to the jury); and 
(iii) Commercial Investment Corporation was not excused from tendering 
its performance and from performing its contractual obligations including its annual 
interest payment obligations; and 
(iv) Commercial Investment Corporation is not allowed to assert that it was 
excused from failing to perform its obligations by any one of the following: 
a) estoppel, b) waiver and/or unclean hands. 
(v) Commercial Investment Corporation is not entitled to specific 
performance of the Real Estate Contract; and 
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(vi) The Siggards performed all steps necessary to forfeit Commercial 
Investment Corporation's interest in the contract; and 
(vii) The Notice of Interest was filed by Commercial Investment Corporation 
in violation of Utah Wrongful Lien Statute; and 
(viii) Commercial Investment Corporation breached the Real Estate Contract; 
and 
(ix) Considering only the evidence concerning damages, and without being 
concerned with the fault of any party in answering this question, what amount of 
money would fairly and accurately compensate the Siggards for actual damages 
suffered by them proximately caused by the filing of the Notice of Interest? 
Amount: $ -0-
Based upon the findings of the jury and the stipulations of the parties, the Court enters 
the following Judgment: 
1. Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint for Specific Performance is dismissed with 
prejudice; 
2. Siggards' Counterclaims for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing are hereby granted, the Real Estate Contract is hereby made null and 
void, and Commercial Investment Corporation's interest in any and all real property under the 
Real Estate Contract is forfeited; and 
3. Siggards' Counterclaim for Wrongful Lien, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 38-9-1 
is hereby granted and, because no actual damages were offered at trial or found by the jury, the 
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statutory penalty of $1,000 is hereby entered of record, with a memorandum of costs and 
attorneys' fees to be submitted. 
DATED this / ( / day of August, 1995. 
Approved as to Form: 
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
Honorable Glenn K. Iwasa 
District Judge 
By. 
James L. Christensen 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Counterclaim Defendant 
Commercial Investment Corporation 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
By. 
Randall N. Skanchy 
Attorneys for Defendants and Counterclaim 
Plaintiffs Don and Glenna F. Siggard, as 
Trustees of the Don Siggard and Glenna F. 
Siggard Family Trust 
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Third judicial District 
Randall N. Skanchy (USB #2968) 
Scott D. Cheney (USB #6198) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Defendants 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Post Office Box 45444 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
COMMERCIAL INVESTMENT CORP. 
Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
vs. : 
DON SIGGARD AND GLENNA F. : 
SIGGARD, as Trustees for the Don Siggard : Case No. 920904431CV 
and Glenna F. Siggard Family Trust, : 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Defendants. : 
Plaintiff Commercial Investment Corporation's Motion for New Trial came on for 
oral argument before the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki on Wednesday, November 1, 1995 at 
9:00 a.m. Commercial Investment Corporation ("CIC") was represented at the hearing by 
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James C. Christensen; Randall N. Skanchy and Scott D. Cheney appeared on behalf of the 
Siggards. 
CIC's Motion for New Trial was based on two grounds: 1) That the jury's finding 
that CIC's filing of the Notice of Interest violated the Utah Wrongful Lien Statute, Utah 
Code Ann. Section 38-9-1 et seq. was against the law and unsupported by the evidence; and 
2) that the jury's finding that the Siggards performed all steps necessary to forfeit CIC's 
interest in the Real Estate Contract was against the law and unsupported by the evidence. 
The Court, having now considered CIC's motion, the memoranda and authority 
submitted by the parties, and, having heard oral argument and having been fully advised in 
the premises, hereby ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs arguments as to the jury's finding of CIC's violation of the 
Wrongful Lien Statute and of the Siggards' performing all steps neccessary to forfeit CIC's 
interest in the Real Estate Contract are not compelling. 
2. The evidence submitted to the jury at the trial of this case was sufficient to 
support the jury's findings that CIC's filing of the Notice of Interest violated the Utah 
Wrongful Lien Statute and that the Siggards performed all steps necessary to forfeit CIC's 
interest in the Real Estate Contract. 
3. The law presented to and applied by the jury at trial as to those issues was 
correct. 
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Based on these findings it is hereby ORDERED that Plainitiff CIC's Motion for 
New Trial is DENIED. / 2 i _ 
DATED this _ / day of November, 1995. 
BY THE CO 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Randall N. Skanchy 
Scott D. Cheney 
Attorneys for Defendants 
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
ccZecz. 
James\Christensen 
AtteFfleys for Plaintiff 
144768 1 3 
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September 8, 1992 
James L. Christensen, Esq. 
Corbridge, Baird & Christensen 
Attorneys at Law 
215 South State Street, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RE: Commercial Investment Corp. v. Siggard et al. 
Dear James: 
Enclosed please find a copy of the Answer and 
Counterclaim which has, by this time, been filed in this matter. 
At this time, I am putting your client on notice of a 
few things. First, please consider this letter a written request 
to remove the Notice of Interest filed on my clients' property. 
If it is not removed within twenty days, the defendants and 
counterclaimants will strongly seek three times the actual dam-
ages as provided in the applicable statute. Since your Complaint 
seeks nothing but damages, I feel the Notice of Interest is 
groundless and no more than a cloud to the title at this point. 
B»uce c. COKE 
CPAiG r VINCENT 
• wviNG H siCLE 
lABBY A. KjpftHAM 
PANOV S, COKE 
CU«TiS c. N f S S E T 
Or COuNSfL 
M E N W Y 5, NYGAARO 
As has 
Deen tne case ail along, my clients would still need to know 
which sixteen acres your client wants. 
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September 8, 1992 
James L. Christensen, Esq. 
Please let me hear from you regarding your client's 
position in this matter as soon as possible. 
Sincerely, 
NYGAARD, COftE Sr VINCENT 
Rarfdy BT. Coke 
RBC.aa 
Ends. 
cc. Mr. and Mrs. Don Siggard 
Lewis Livingston, Esq. 
TabP 
JUDGEMENT 
Randall N. Skanchy (USB #2968) 
Scott D. Cheney (USB #6198) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Defendants 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Post Office Box 45444 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
FILED SISTHtCTCeUST 
Third Judicial District 
NOV 9 1995 
/ . /SALT LAME CO UNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
COMMERCIAL INVESTMENT CORP. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DON SIGGARD AND GLENNA F. 
SIGGARD, as Trustees for the Don Siggard 
and Glenna F. Siggard Family Trust, 
Defendants. 
ORDER AWARDING JUDGMENT 
AGAINST CIC FOR: 
(1) ATTORNEY FEES AND EXPERT 
FEES; AND 
(2) COSTS AND DISBURSEMENTS 
Case No. 920904431CV S S O M O T Q, 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki ^ ^ ^ " ^ - ^ ) * 3 CX^v 
Defendants Don Siggard and Glenna F. Siggard as Trustees for the Don Siggard 
and Glenna F. Siggard Family Trust ("Siggards") Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees and 
entry of Costs and Disbursements against plaintiff Commercial Investment Corporation's 
("CIC") came on for oral argument before the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki at a hearing on 
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Wednesday, November 1, 1995 at 9:00 a.m. The Siggards were represented by Randall N. 
Skanchy and Scott D. Cheney and James C. Christensen appeared on behalf of CIC. 
The Court having considered the motions, supporting memoranda and the authority 
submitted by the parties and affidavits of attorneys fees and memorandum of costs and 
disbursements and having heard oral argument and otherwise having been fully advised of the 
premises, hereby: 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows: 
1. That the Siggards are awarded as a judgment against CIC costs and 
disbursements in the amount of $1,290.40 as the prevailing party in this litigation, the 
Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements having been filed on August 22, 1995 and no 
opposition to it presented by written objection or oral argument by counsel for CIC; and 
2. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
Defendant's Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees and Expert's Fees is granted as a 
judgment against CIC and awarded as follows: 
Pre-trial and trial attorneys fees - $10,000.00 
Post-trial attorneys fees - $ 4,000.00 
Expert witness fees - $ 3.325.00 
TOTAL $17,325.00 
The amounts awarded are based on the determination of the Court upon the 
following findings of facts and conclusions of law: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
(i) The legal work set forth in the affidavits of counsel for Siggards was 
performed; and 
(ii) The legal rates charged for the work performed are consistent with the rates 
customarily charged in this locality for such legal services; and 
(iii) Additional facts considered were the experience, reputation and ability of 
the lawyers, the substantial amount involved in the dispute and the result obtained; and 
(iv) That the sum of $10,000.00 for the work performed by counsel in pre-trial 
motions, trial preparation and trial, and the sum of $4,000.00 for the post trial motions and 
the sum of $3,325.00 for expert witness fees at trial were reasonable and necessary to 
prosecute the Wrongful Lien claim in this action. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
(i) The hours of legal services set forth in the affidavits were actually 
performed. 
(ii) The legal rates charged for the work performed are consistent with the rates 
customarily charged in this locality for such services. 
(iii) Additional factors of the experience, reputation and ability of the Siggard's 
lawyers, the substantial amount involved in the dispute and the result obtained are factors the 
court may and did consider in determining the reasonableness of attorneys' fees; 
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(iv) The sum of $14,000.00 in attorneys fees and $3,325.00 in expert witness 
fees were reasonable and necessary in the prosecution of the Wrongful Lien claim in this 
action 
3. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this 
Judgment for attorneys fees, expert witness fees, and costs and disbursements in the total 
amount of $18,615.40 shall bear post-judgment interest at the judicial rate until paid in full 
and that this Judgment may be augmented in the amount of costs and fees incurred in 
collecting such Judgment, including reasonable attorneys' fees, and that such augmentation 
may be made by affidavit of counsel. 
DATED this / day of November, 1995. 
BY THE CO 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
By 
Randall N. Skanchy 
Scott D. Cheney 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
lames C. Christensen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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